Historical transformations of the lower Jordan river basin (in Jordan) : changes in water use and projections (1950-2025) by Courcier, R. et al.
ISSN 1391-9407
ISBN 92-9090-609
Postal Address: IWMI, P O Box 2075, Colombo, Sri Lanka   Location: 127 Sunil Mawatha, Pelawatte, Battaramulla, Sri Lanka
Telephone: +94-11 2787404, 2784080   Fax: +94-11 2786854
Email: comp.assessment@cgiar.org   Website: www.iwmi.org/assessment
Historical Transformations of the Lower Jordan River Basin (in Jordan):
Changes in Water Use and Projections (1950-2025)
Rémy Courcier, Jean-Philippe Venot and François Molle
Research Report 9
Figure to be inserted
I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Water  Management
I n s t i t u t e
The Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture takes
stock of the costs, benefits and impacts of the past 50 years of water development
for agriculture, the water management challenges communities are facing today,
and solutions people have developed. The results of the Assessment will enable
farming communities, governments and donors to make better-quality investment
and management decisions to meet food and environmental security objectives in
the near future and over the next 25 years.
The Research Report Series captures results of collaborative research conducted
under the Assessment. It also includes reports contributed by individual scientists
and organizations that significantly advance knowledge on key Assessment
questions. Each report undergoes a rigorous peer-review process. The research
presented in the series feeds into the Assessment’s primary output—a “State of
the World” report and set of options backed by hundreds of leading water and
development professionals and water users.
Reports in this series may be copied freely and cited with due
acknowledgement. Electronic copies of reports can be downloaded from the
Assessment website (www.iwmi.org/assessment).
If you are interested in submitting a report for inclusion in the series, please
see the submission guidelines available on the Assessment website or send a
written request to: Sepali Goonaratne, P.O. Box 2075, Colombo, Sri Lanka.
Comprehensive Assessment outputs contribute to the Dialogue
on Water, Food and Environment Knowledge Base.
iComprehensive Assessment of Water Management in
Agriculture Research Report 9
Historical Transformations of the Lower
Jordan River Basin (in Jordan): Changes in
Water Use and Projections (1950–2025)
Rémy Courcier
Jean-Philippe Venot
and
François Molle
with contributions by Rebhieh Suleiman and Aida Jridi
International Water Management Institute
P O Box 2075, Colombo, Sri Lanka
The authors: Rémy Courcier was formerly head of the MREA (French Regional Mission
for Water and Agriculture) of the French Embassy in Amman; Jean-Philippe Venot was
formerly a master student at the ‘Institut National Agronomique de Paris-Grignon’ working
with MREA. He is now a PhD student with the International Water Management Institute;
François Molle is a Principal Researcher at the Institut de Recherche pour le Développement
(IRD), France, currently seconded to the International Water Management Institute,
Colombo, Sri Lanka.
This report is the result of a comprehensive study of water resource development and use
in the Jordanian part of the LJRB developed through to a collaboration between the French
Regional Mission for Water and Agriculture of the French Embassy in Jordan (MREA) and
the International Water Management Institute (IWMI), within the framework of the
Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture.
This document greatly benefited from comments made by Peter McCornick and R. Orthofer
on its earlier versions. The authors also gratefully acknowledge the help and support
given by Susan Taha, Naief Seder, Youssef Hassan, Philip Magiera and Jochen Regner.
Courcier, R.; Venot, J.-P.; Molle, F. 2005. Historical transformations of the lower Jordan
river basin (in Jordan): Changes in water use and projections (1950-2025). Colombo, Sri
Lanka: International Water Management Institute. 91p. (Comprehensive Assessment of
Water Management in Agriculture Research Report 9)
/ river basins / water use / water resources development / history / water use efficiency /
hydrology / water policy / water balance / land use / Jordan /
ISSN 1391-9407
ISBN 92-9090-609
Copyright © 2005, by International Water Management Institute. All rights reserved.
Please send inquiries and comments to: comp.assessment@cgiar.org
The Comprehensive Assessment (www.iwmi.cgiar.org/assessment) is organized through the CGIAR’s
System-Wide Initiative on Water Management (SWIM), which is convened by the International Water
Management Institute. The Assessment is carried out with inputs from over 100 national and international
development and research organizations—including CGIAR Centers and FAO. Financial support for
the Assessment comes from a range of donors, including the Governments of the Netherlands,
Switzerland, Japan, Taiwan, Sweden ( through the Swedish Water House) and Austria; EU support to
the ISIIMM Project; the OPEC Fund; FAO; Challenge Program on Water and Food; World Bank in
support of Systemwide Programs and the Rockefeller Foundation. Cosponsors of the Assessment
are: FAO; the Ramsar Conventions and the CGIAR.
iii
iii
Contents
Summary .......................................................................................................... v
Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1
Main Features of the Lower Jordan River Basin (LJRB) in Jordan ............... 2
History of Water Resources Development ...................................................... 5
Situation in the 1950s: Pre-exploitation Phase ............................................... 9
Situation in the Mid-1970s: The Exploitation Phase ....................................... 12
Situation in the 2000s: Growing Scarcity Problems ........................................ 15
Emerging Problems in 2000-2025 and Expected Evolutions ......................... 22
Water Accounting of the Lower Jordan River Basin: Historical Trends ......... 31
Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 47
Appendix 1 ........................................................................................................ 49
Appendix 2 ........................................................................................................ 65
Appendix 3 ........................................................................................................ 66
Appendix 4 ........................................................................................................ 67
Appendix 5 ........................................................................................................ 68
Appendix 6 ........................................................................................................ 73
Appendix 7 ........................................................................................................ 75
Appendix 8 ........................................................................................................ 76
Bibliography ...................................................................................................... 77
vSummary
The Lower Jordan river basin (LJRB), defined as
a hydrological entity, is a region of prime
importance for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan:
this area includes 83 percent of the total
population of Jordan, and most of the main
industries in the country, 80 percent of irrigated
agriculture, and receives 80 percent of the
national water resources. During the last 50 years,
because of a demographic boom and generalized
economic development, the Jordanian part of the
LJRB has experienced an intensive and rapid
process of mobilization of its rare water resources.
 This report presents a qualitative and
quantitative assessment of the history of water
resources mobilization and uses within the LJRB.
It illustrates the gradual “artificialization” and
“complexification” of this river basin from a
situation around 1950, where only 10,000
hectares were irrigated, groundwater was
untapped and abundant water flowed to the Dead
Sea, to the current situation where 46,000
hectares are irrigated and all surface resources
are tapped and committed, and groundwater is
being severely mined. Both the Jordan valley and
the highlands, on the one hand, and agriculture
and cities, on the other, are now interconnected
and interdependent.
 Presently, the available water resources in
the LJRB are renewed at a rate of 705 million
cubic meters per year (Mm3/yr including 155 Mm3/
yr of groundwater and 550 Mm3/yr for surface
water). The total amount of water withdrawn within
the basin reaches 585 Mm3/yr (i.e., 83% of the
renewable surface and groundwater), including
275 Mm3/yr in groundwater abstraction (i.e., a
gross overdraft of the aquifers of 120 Mm3/yr) and
310 Mm3/yr of surface water diversion (including
60 Mm3/yr of treated wastewater). The basin also
imports each year 30 Mm3 of groundwater and 45
Mm3 of surface water. The rest flows uncontrolled
to the Dead Sea (215 Mm3/yr).
 Patterns of water use reflect changes in the
wider economy. Extensive rain-fed agriculture in
the highlands increased before the mid-1970s but
later declined with the change in the economy
and the growth of cities. The most intensive part
of the agriculture sector (cultivation in the
highlands and the valley, oriented to the export of
vegetables and fruits) is affected by changes in
relative competitiveness with regard to other
regional producers and also by changes in market
prices. Population growth, also linked to the wider
political situation in the Middle East, increased
pressure on the water resources. Because of the
unquestionable priority given to domestic water
use and the large share of the agricultural water
use, the future of irrigated agriculture is uncertain.
The most questionable part of agricultural use is
the low-profitability olive trees planted in the
desert plateau that make up half of the highland
irrigated area and which consume about
one-fourth of the total high-quality groundwater
abstracted for agricultural purposes in the LJRB.
The resulting depletion of the aquifers is likely to
jeopardize their use for domestic water supply as
they become saltier.
 Intensive agriculture in the valley relies on
surface water uses and is likely to remain stable,
even if its water supply is reduced in quantity and
quality. Banana cultivation yields high economic
benefits but these benefits are artificial, due to
protective customs duties. The likely future
disappearance of these duties due to World Trade
Organization (WTO) agreements, and a
redefinition of allocation or of water prices might
encourage a shift towards less-water-intensive
crops, such as date palm trees in the south of
the valley.
 Such a reorientation and other measures
necessary to achieve better water management
are faced with some sociopolitical difficulties
within the Jordanian society. Only a global
vi
awareness of the problems that Jordan faces
could mitigate these difficulties and allow for the
implementation of the measures needed. Another
aspect of the transformations that have occurred
in the LJRB is the shift in water policy. Calls for
demand management have been only partially
incorporated or implemented, mainly for
sociopolitical reasons. The prevailing mid- and
long-term solutions are eventually typical capital-
and technology-intensive supply augmentation
projects, namely large-scale interbasin transfers
and desalinization. This may be seen as the
lasting dominance of the engineering-based
approach but this also shows that however
desirable they may be, demand-management
options may only alleviate the actual situation
without providing long-term solutions.
 The quantitative analysis of these evolutions
has shown that most of the indicators (such as
depleted fraction, processed fraction of water
resources) varied sharply between 1950 and
1975, on account of both a growth in rain-fed and
irrigated agriculture, and the quasi interruption of
the flows coming from the Upper Jordan. In the
following 25 years, water use became
unsustainable because of overdraft of the aquifers
(and concomitant reduction of the flow in the
Yarmouk). While around 2,700 Mm3 of surface
water and rainfall enter the basin each year on
average, only 200 Mm3/yr reach the Dead Sea.
The difference is depleted (effectively used),
18 percent of it in irrigated fields, 18 percent in
rain-fed areas, and 3 percent in municipal and
industrial uses, the remaining 61 percent being
evaporated either in grassland and forest, or in
desert areas. Overdraft of aquifers and
competition for water can only be rebalanced
through some contraction of irrigated agriculture,
together with an increase in the use of treated
wastewater and in interbasin transfers.
11The population of Jordan increased from 0.58 million in the early 1950s to 2.13 million in 1979 to finally reach 5.33 million in 2003
(that is essentially linked to the decrease in infant mortality and to the transfer of Palestinian populations).
2That is, annual surface runoff and aquifer recharge.
3In comparison, the World Bank generally considers that 500 m3 per capita per year constitute “the poverty threshold” below which it is
necessary to mobilize new water resources. Despite all the difficulties in defining and considering relevant thresholds (see Molle and
Mollinga 2003), Jordan—with such a level of water availability—will always be at the bottom of the table.
4Averaging, for example, 0.5 meters a year in the Amman-Zarqa groundwater basin (ARD 2001; Chebaane et al. 2004).
Lower Jordan River Basin (in Jordan): Changes in
Water Use and Projections (1950–2025)
Rémy Courcier, Jean-Philippe Venot and François Molle
Introduction
Due to both scarcity of water resources and an
important demographic boom1 and despite a high
degree of infrastructural development, the per
capita water allocation which was at 3,600 m3/
year and per person in 1946 has sharply
decreased: water availability in Jordan has been
estimated at only 163 m3 of renewable blue water2
per capita per year (according to the Ministry of
Water and Irrigation Master Plan 2004), a quantity
expected to further decrease down to 90 m3/year/
person in 2025 (Ferragina 2000; Abu-Sharar
2002).3 At the same time, the average domestic
consumption only reaches 94 liters per capita/day
(lpc/day) nationwide (THKJ 2004).
In this situation of extreme scarcity, irrigated
agriculture, which significantly contributed to the
development of Jordan during the years 1970–
1980s (Elmusa 1994; Nachbaur 2004), uses two-
thirds of the available water resources. Its future
is thus questionable. In order to sustain
agricultural development as well as to meet the
increasing urban and industrial needs linked to
demographic growth and economic development,
Jordan has reached a point where it overexploits
its water resources.
In the 2000s, while available renewable
resources are evaluated at around 860 Mm3/yr at
the country level (Scott et al. 2003), with 335
Mm3/yr of uncontrolled surface water, a total of
845 Mm3 are abstracted annually (i.e., 98% of the
renewable resources), of which 585 Mm3/yr in the
Lower Jordan River Basin (LJRB) (computation
according to MWI [Ministry of Water and
Irrigation] records and the THKJ 2004). This is
possible only because of reuse of water and of
the overexploitation of aquifers, which causes a
drop in the water table4 and the degradation of
groundwater resources, since overexploitation
leads also to an increase in salt concentration
within the aquifers (notably in the case of the
Azraq oasis, in the east of the country).
Collaboration between the French Regional
Mission for Water and Agriculture of the French
Embassy in Jordan (MREA) and the International
Water Management Institute (IWMI), within the
framework of the Comprehensive Assessment of
Water Management in Agriculture, allowed the
development of a comprehensive study of water
use in the Jordanian part of the LJRB. The aim of
the present report is to develop a qualitative and
2quantitative outlook of the history of water
resources mobilization and use within this basin.
After 50 years of accelerated development,
uses of the resources have reached an
unsustainable level. Because of the rapidity
and intensity of the changes observed, the
LJRB appears as a good illustration of the
complexity of water management in a
developing country faced with a situation of
extreme water scarcity.
The section on “Main Features of the Lower
Jordan River Basin in Jordan”provides an
overview of the basin’s main features. The
section on “History of Water Resources
Development” recounts the development of the
basin and details both the changes in water use
and the wider context of agricultural and societal
change. And the section on “Situation in the
1950s: Pre-exploitation Phase” parallels this
analysis by a calculation of the terms of the
basin water accounting and allows a better
quantification and characterization of the
transformations that occurred. The conclusion
recaps the main lessons learned.
Main Features of the LJRB in Jordan
General Presentation
The Jordan river is an international river which
drains a total area of about 18,000 km². Its three
headwater tributaries originating from the slopes
of Mount Hermon drain the Upper Jordan river
basin and flow southward into Lake Tiberius.
They are the Hisbani, coming from Lebanon, the
Banias, coming from Syria and the Dan coming
from the Syrian Golan Heights, occupied by Israel
since 1967. Apart from some irrigated agriculture
north of Lake Tiberius, almost all water from the
three tributaries is collected in the lake, which
acts now as a freshwater reservoir currently used
almost exclusively by Israel. The outflow of the
Jordan river from Lake Tiberius is virtually
blocked and only consists of some saline springs
and wastewater, as we will see later.
The Jordan river flows southward in a nearly
130-km-long longitudinal depression named the
Jordan valley before discharging into the Dead
Sea. The valley results from a continental rift
located between the Mediterranean and the
African plates, which led to a lowering of the floor
down to 400 meters below sea level.
Ten kilometers downstream of Lake Tiberius,
the Lower Jordan river receives the water from its
main tributary, the Yarmouk river. Originally, this
river coming from the northeast of Syria
contributed almost half of the Lower Jordan river
flow, the other half coming from the Upper Jordan
river. Several temporary streams of lesser
importance named “side-wadis,” with the
exception of the larger Zarqa river, come from the
two mountainous banks and feed the Lower
Jordan river. Prior to water development projects,
the original flow of the Jordan river into the Dead
Sea varied between 1,100 and 1,400 Mm3/yr.
(Klein 1998; Al-Weshah 2000; El-Nasser 1998.)
Our study focusses on the Jordanian part of
the LJRB, without considering issues related to
water sharing between the riparian states of the
Jordan river. The Yarmouk river (and the Upper
Jordan) are thus considered as giving inflows to
this basin. Moreover, the other streams draining
to the Dead Sea from the south and from Israel
are also not analyzed and taken as mere
contributions to the basin.
What will be referred to as the LJRB in what
follows represents 40 percent of the entire Jordan
river basin but only 7.8 percent of the Jordanian
territory (cf., figure 1). The basin so defined is
nevertheless the wettest area in Jordan and
supplies 80 percent of the national water
resources. It is a region where 83 percent of the
population is concentrated and where the potential
3for economic development is at its highest.
Moreover, irrigated agriculture, which uses
70 percent of the national water resources, is
also mainly concentrated in this area, as we will
see later.
Physical Setting
The basin, like the country, is divided into two
main areas: the Jordan valley and the remaining
part referred to here by the term "highlands."
The highlands are composed of a mountain
range running alongside the Jordan valley and of
a desert plateau extending easterly to Syria and
Iraq. About 30 km wide, with an altitude reaching
1,000 m above sea level, the mountains, which
consist of sedimentary rocks—essentially
limestone—are incised by several side-wadis (or
lateral intermittent streams) draining surface water
to the Jordan river. These mountains receive
around 400 to 600 mm of rain per year with a
peak in January-February and are the rainiest
areas of the country (figure 2). Snowfall can be
observed where the altitude exceeds 700 m.
Historically, they were covered with forests
(essentially composed of Mediterranean conifers),
but now they are mostly rangelands with
occasional olive trees and stone-fruits trees.
The plateau has an average altitude of 600 m
and is mainly used to grow cereals near the
mountain, in the area where main urban
agglomerations (Amman, Irbid, Al-Baq’ah, Jerash,
and Ajloun) are concentrated and where rainfall is
FIGURE 1.
Limits and drainage area of the LJRB (pink) and its extent in Jordan (red line).
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4still sufficient. Eastward, precipitations become
scarcer (between 200 and 300 mm/year), and
only nomadic Bedouin livestock farming can be
found.
The Jordan valley is a 130 km stretch
between the Yarmouk river in the north and the
Dead Sea in the south; it is the northern part of
the Jordan rift valley, extending from Lake
Tiberius in the north to the Red Sea in the south,
over a total length of 360 km. Its altitude varies
from 200 m (in the north) to 400 m (in the south)
below sea level. The valley can be considered as
a natural greenhouse: temperature increases by
around 1°C as the altitude decreases by 100 m.
Temperatures are thus moderate during winter
(between 15°C and 22°C on average between
November and March) and reach some record
levels during summer, commonly exceeding 45°C
during the day in the months of June, July and
August. The climate is semi-arid in the north
(precipitations of 350 mm/year) and arid in the
south (50 mm/year near the Dead Sea).
The Jordan river flows in a 30 to 60 m deep
gorge through a narrow alluvial, fertile plain locally
called "Al Zhor" (cf., figure 3) from 200 m to
2 km wide; it can be flooded during some
exceptional events. The rest of the valley, called
"Al Ghor" in Arabic, is a fertile area formed by
colluviums coming from neighboring mountains
and lying on alluvial sediments of Lake Lisan,
which covered the area 14,000 years ago. Gently
sloping (1.5 to 2.5%) from the mountains, it is 20
km wide in the south, narrows down to 4 km in
the middle, and finally widens to 10 km in the
north. In these two areas, soils are deep and of
good quality but, because of the climate, only a
steppe and some grassland existed before the
reclamation of the valley, with the notable
exception of small areas irrigated by the
side-wadis and springs.
FIGURE 2.
Rainfall distribution in the LJRB (adapted from EXACT 1998).
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5History of Water Resources Development
General Remarks and Methodology
This report presents a synthesis on the following
issues:
• The water resources of the LJRB.
(The hydrology of the basin will also be
presented.)
• The evolution of the development and
use of these water resources from the
1950s to the mid-2020s (we will use 2025
as a reference date).
• The corresponding evolution of the water
accounting for the basin.
This report is based on four successive
charts illustrating the situation of water use at
four different points in time: 1950 (which can be
considered as an initial “predevelopment” state),
1975 (for which a complete study of the
hydrological situation of Jordan is available)5 and
2000 for which most of the figures presented are
FIGURE 3.
Topography of the LJRB in Jordan.
available because of many studies done recently
on the water sector in Jordan. Last, the year
2025 is used as a time horizon for projections
and discussions on future trends. We will
particularly focus on water resources, and the
process of mobilization and utilization of these
resources for each of the four different periods.
We will also try to link these changes to more
general transformations observed during the
period studied.
The figures presented in the historical
description are expressed in Mm3/yr and have
generally been rounded up to 5 Mm3/yr. Moreover,
we used average figures referring to 5 to 10 years
around the date indicated on the charts
(1950, 1975, 2000 and 2025). These figures were
extracted from a comprehensive list of
references (presented in appendix 1). With this
method, we do not consider the year-to-year
variability that can affect the water balance.
Although this variability is important in terms of
management, we are focusing here on
long-term evolutions characterized by average
balances.
5Carried out by the Jordanian MWI with the support of German cooperation.
6In our representations of water flows, we
used arrows to represent natural river flows and
water transfers from one place to another. The
bigger the flow/transfer the larger the arrow. Water
quality is also suggested, with a variation from
freshwater (blue) to wastewater (green) or saline
water (yellow). We used rectangles to represent
groundwater basins and their capacity as well as
geometrical shapes to represent the irrigated
areas. Again, the larger the water resources/
irrigated areas the bigger the rectangles and other
geometrical shapes. We do not distinguish
between river base-flows and winter runoff flows
(“floods”). The legend presented in figure 4 shows
all the symbols used on the charts presented in
this report.
Hydrology of the LJRB
We will present in this section the natural or
theoretical hydrology of the Jordanian part of
the LJRB prior to any kind of water
development.
Total precipitation in Jordan is estimated at
8,500 Mm3/yr (of which about 2,200 Mm3/yr fall
within the LJRB); in crude terms, 85 percent of
this precipitation is evaporated (50% of this
evaporation being beneficial since processed
either by irrigated or rain-fed crops, 5 percent
flows into the rivers and the remaining 10 percent
infiltrates to recharge the aquifers [El-Nasser
1998]). Figure 5 describes the natural hydrology
of the basin.
FIGURE 4.
Legends used in the charts.
Note: The charts indicate the total safe yield of each aquifer. These values do not always correspond to the Jordanian safe yield
(corresponding to the sustainable rate of groundwater exploitation within Jordan) since some of the groundwater basins are not entirely
located in Jordan.
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7FIGURE 5.
LJRB: Hydrology.
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Surface Water
Surface water in the basin mainly comes from
Lake Tiberius (natural reservoir collecting water
from the Upper Jordan), the Yarmouk, the Zarqa
rivers as well as other side-wadis incising the
mountains.
• The Upper Jordan hydrological flow into
Lake Tiberius has been estimated at 890
Mm3/yr and the evaporation within the
lake at 285 Mm3/yr. The outflow thus
averaged 605 Mm3/yr before the 1950s
(Klein 1998). The bulk of this resource is
8now diverted by Israel to its National
Water Carrier.
• The Yarmouk river is the main tributary of
the Lower Jordan river and represents the
main share of Jordan’s surface water.
The Yarmouk watercourse is fed by
springs and wadis mainly originating in
Syria. The annual flow of the Yarmouk
river evaluated at the confluence of the
Lower Jordan river was 440 to 470 Mm3/
yr for the period 1927–1954 (Salameh and
Bannayan 1993). (We have used 470
Mm3/yr in our charts.)
• Before reaching the Dead Sea, the
Jordan river is fed by several side-wadis.
To get clearer representations, we have
chosen to pool them in three groups: the
northern side-wadis, the southern
side-wadis and the Zarqa river, which
contribute 90, 30 and 90 Mm3/yr
respectively (Baker and Harza 1955).
• The contribution of smaller flows of
side-wadis located on the West Bank
(Israel and Palestinian territories) is also
taken into consideration.
These flows are indicated in figure 5, which
depicts natural flows in the (hypothetical)
absence of any use or diversion. It can be used
as a backdrop to assess historical
transformations.
Groundwater
The Yarmouk and north side-wadi basins. (125
Mm3/yr; Salameh and Bannayan 1993.) For the
sake of simplifying the charts, these two
groundwater basins have been pooled together
into a unique aquifer replenished by water
infiltrating in the northern mountains (and are
represented by a unique rectangle entitled
“Yarmouk basin” on the charts).6
The mean total annual usable recharge7 of
this aquifer has been estimated at 125 Mm3/yr.
According to THKJ (2004), the net recharge of
the part of the Yarmouk basin located within
Jordan is 35 to 40 Mm3/yr. The side-wadi basin is
annually replenished by 30 to 40 Mm3/yr
(cf., figure 6). In addition, the latter receives 25
Mm3/yr of underground transfers from the
Yarmouk basin (Salameh 1990), which are part of
the north side-wadis base-flow.
The Jordan Valley Basin (30 Mm3/yr). The aquifer
of the Jordan valley receives 30 Mm3/yr through
direct infiltrations coming from the Jordan river,
the valley area and neighboring hills (THKJ 1977;
Salameh 1993), out of which 15 to 20 originate
within Jordan (THKJ 2004). Unlike the other
basins, the water here is slightly brackish or salty
and some hot springs can also be found.
The Amman-Zarqa Basin (88 Mm3/yr). Of this
groundwater basin 85 percent is located within
Jordan (the remaining 15% lying in Syria) and it
represents the most important groundwater
reservoir of the LJRB. It can be divided into two
parts; the first one in the east receives the
infiltrations from the rainy area of the Djebel Druze
in Syria; the second part receives infiltrations from
the mountains around Amman. The annual usable
recharge of the entire basin reaches 88 Mm3/yr,
including 70 Mm3/yr within Jordan (Salameh and
Bannayan 1993; ARD/USAID 2001; Chebaane et
al. 2004). THKJ (2004) indicates a recharge
between 65 and 70 Mm3/yr (cf., figure 6).
6Moreover, the southern part of the side-wadis aquifer is also not represented on the charts (because of limited abstraction occurring
there). In the last section of this report, however, quantitative water balances distinguish between the Yarmouk and the northern and
the southern parts of the side-wadis aquifers.
7We define the “usable recharge” as the direct recharge minus the baseflow. See footnote 22 for discussion on this definition.
9Situation in the 1950s: Pre-exploitation Phase
Historical Background
The Jordan basin is considered one of the
cradles of humankind. Around 6,000 B.C., owing,
among other things, to a climate probably less
arid than today, domestication of crops and
animals allowed the development of the first
cities city (Jericho). Since then, the Jordan valley
has seen fluctuating periods of development,
stagnation, and decline as well as several
successive political upheavals. The region has
thus been successively under the control of the
Arameans, the Edomites, the Greeks, the
Romans, the Byzantines (Umayyad), the
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Ottomans and the British. We can, for example,
mention a prosperous period around 700–800 B.C.
when the Umayyad used the entire Jordan valley
to grow sugarcane, before production in the south
of Italy came to dominate the market. On the
other hand, the Ottoman period (900–1920 B.C.)
was one of stagnation for a province located at
the empire’s margin (Abujaber 1988; Lancaster
1999). The United Kingdom’s (Balfour Declaration
1917) and the international community’s (through
the League of Nations) support to the
establishment of a Jewish state opened the way
to radical modifications of the water resources
regime in the Jordan basin. In this context, and
FIGURE 6.
Groundwater basins in the LJRB in Jordan.
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mainly during the British mandate (1931-1946), a
beginning of development was thus observed.
Several studies of hydraulic development (irrigation
and hydroelectricity) and several attempts to an
amicable sharing of water resources between the
riparian parties saw the light8, but they were applied
only much later and partially, due to the political
instability of the region.
By 1950, the main changes caused by the
creation of the Israeli State, namely its access to
the Upper Jordan water resources and the
displacements of the Palestinian populations, had
already taken place but it was still too early to
sense their consequences on the effective use of
water resources. We, therefore, present the
situation of the basin as it could be observed
before the creation of Israel critically changed the
situation.
Until the 1950s, the Jordan valley was only
sparsely populated and was mainly dependant on
a subsistence agricultural production limited by
natural conditions which had become drier than
before. It is estimated that in 1939 the
Trans-Jordan population amounted to 325,000
inhabitants who, in their great majority, made a
living from agriculture in the uplands and from
pastoralism in the eastern desert (Lancaster
1999). Cities located in the highlands were still
not very developed. Amman’s population, for
example, was only around 100,000 while Irbid,
which is today the largest city in the north of
Jordan, had a population of only 25,000 (Baker
and Harza 1955). Bedouins traditionally used the
valley during winter where they could find the
forage needed for their herds. They were
cultivating wheat, barley, maize and some
vegetables, irrigating them from the Yarmouk river
and from other side-wadis. During summer, they
left with their herds to the fresher mountains
where they met the "fellahin" (sedentary
population), cultivating olive trees and cereals.
The techniques used at that time to
develop water resources (small dams and earth
or masonry canals) allowed domestic water
supply and the irrigation of small areas located
along the side-wadis. In the highlands, direct
use from springs and from tanks collecting
local rainfall also allowed this double use
(Khouri 1981; Lancaster 1999). The cities were
supplied by neighboring springs. The first
instances of dams and groundwater pumping
were observed during the 1940s but these two
options remained limited and their development
took place only during the 1960s. This was
triggered by the first roads (built during the
British Mandate), which resulted in traditional
self-sufficiency-oriented agriculture being shifted
slowly towards market-oriented production of
the cities.
Figure 7 illustrates the situation regarding
water resources on the territory then called
Transjordan, as well as their utilization before the
creation of the State of Israel which dramatically
altered these conditions.9
Water Resources and Uses in the 1950s
• Cities are essentially supplied by
neighboring springs.
• Surface water coming from the Yarmouk
river, the side-wadis and the Jordan river
itself allows the irrigation of small areas
located along these rivers (around 13,000
ha using 125 Mm3/yr [Baker and Harza
1955] i.e., 9 percent of the Lower Jordan
river flow) and in the alluvial fans of the
valleys.
• No significant groundwater exploitation is
observed.
8For example: The Henriques study (1928), the Ionides study (1939), The Lowdermilk Plan (1944), the Cotton and Arab Plans in
1954, The Johnston Plan and the Harza-Baker study in 1955.
9The State of Israel was established by the United Nations in 1948 and, until 1967, the West Bank was under Jordanian administration,
the eastern bank of the Jordan river being known as the Kingdom of Transjordan.
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FIGURE 7.
Water resources development in the LJRB around 1950, before the development of major diversion schemes.
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Historical Background: Changes Since
1950
In the wake of the 1948–1949 war following the
creation of the State of Israel, a first huge influx
of Palestinian refugees (around 450,000 persons
[El-Nasser 1998]) constituted a major challenge
for a country which had just begun its economic
development. In 1967–1968, after the 6-day war
of June 1967, an additional 400,000 “displaced
persons” immigrated to Jordan (Haddadin 2000).
The demographic boom (there were 450,000
inhabitants in Jordan before 1948 and 2 million in
1975 [De Bel-Air 2003]) resulting from these
“transfers of population” and from a decrease in
infant mortality, is undoubtedly a crucial factor in
explaining the extremely rapid development of the
LJRB’s water resources.
On the other hand, the international
community, which had backed the creation of the
State of Israel, also strongly supported the
economic development of Jordan in order to
alleviate social tensions due to population
displacements and to promote “stability” within
the region. Because of this, the financing of large
facilities quickly allowed the development of
irrigated agriculture in the Jordan valley as part of
a larger socioeconomic development process. In
the Jordan valley, the construction between 1958
and 1966 of a main 69 km-long concrete canal—
King Abdullah Canal (KAC)10—a land reform
allowing the constitution of thousands of small
intensive farms, the construction of several
roads, some urbanization projects and the
development of basic social services allowed the
settlement of people and the development of
modern production of fruits and vegetables
(JVA 1988).11 Within a few years, the traditional
agricultural-cum-livestock model of the nomadic
Bedouins had been replaced by a modern
market-oriented agriculture developed by small
entrepreneurial farmers, which could supply
growing cities and produce a substantial surplus,
which was exported all around the Middle East
(Elmusa 1994; Nachbaur 2004; Venot 2004a).
This evolution can be explained by several
factors, such as the agricultural know-how of the
Palestinian refugees, some capitalistic
investments made by large Jordanian families,
support from international aid and the favorable
market conditions both in Jordan and in the
Middle East. During this period, in the highlands,
the rapid development of cities and of irrigated
agriculture was accompanied by growing
groundwater exploitation. Development of irrigated
agriculture was due to, on the one hand, several
effective actions taken by the Government of
Jordan aiming, since the 1950s, to settle the
nomadic tribes of the area and, on the other, to
various private initiatives during the 1960s and
the 1970s, fueled by the emergence of new
techniques allowing groundwater exploitation
(petrol and electric pumps, drilling of bore holes,
etc.,). Furthermore, potable water supply in the
cities expanded through the development of
public wells in and around urban areas. In cities
located near main springs, the tapping of local
aquifers through wells allowed a strong increase
in the exploitation of local resources. On the
other hand, for some cities, interbasin water
transfers from distant aquifers were needed and
implemented. For example, transfers from the
Azraq oasis (located outside the LJRB) supplied
water to the cities located in the north of the
basin. The later increase in these transfers
compounded the dramatic increase of private
agricultural wells depleting this shallow aquifer,
contributing to the drying up of this wetland.
10Initially named East Ghor Canal.
11A troubled period between 1967 and 1971 interrupted this process. The 6-day war caused the exodus of the entire population
located in the valley to the highlands and it was only after 4 years of internal instability within Jordan and the departure of the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), that the Government of Jordan relaunched, on a larger scale, its development projects in
the Jordan valley.
Situation in the Mid-1970s: The Exploitation Phase
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as well as to serve nearby irrigated
schemes (70 Mm3/yr)— (PASSIA 2001).
• In Jordan, irrigated agriculture developed
on a large scale. In the northern and
middle parts of the Jordan valley, 13,500
hectares were irrigated by using 115 Mm3/
yr (THKJ 1977) coming from the KAC. In
the south, water from several side-wadis
and pumping from the aquifers allowed
the irrigation of around 4,200 hectares
with 55 Mm3/yr (THKJ 1977). In the
highlands, 2,150 hectares were also
irrigated (35 Mm3/yr) in the side-wadis
and the Zarqa river valleys, while around
5,900 hectares were irrigated with
groundwater within the Yarmouk and the
Amman-Zarqa basins (respectively
depleted by 5 and 65 Mm3/yr)—(THKJ
1977).
• The period is also characterized by the
strong development of urban areas such
as Amman-Zarqa (population of 1.1
million), and Irbid (population of 0.36
million), which then used 30 Mm3/yr of
groundwater (THKJ 1977).
• At the same time, Syria also started to
develop its use, essentially agricultural,
of the upper Yarmouk river (90 Mm3/yr
[Hof 1998]) ultimately reducing the flow of
the Lower Yarmouk to the Jordan river to
380 Mm3/yr (cf., figure 8).
• These diversions are done along the
rivers and no reservoir is yet built on the
main tributaries of the Lower Jordan river.
Because of these combined water uses
in Israel, Syria and Jordan, only one-third
(505 Mm3/yr) of the historical flow of the
Jordan river still reaches the Dead Sea.
Water Resources and Uses in the
Mid-1970s
In 1977, the Ministry of Water and Irrigation
(MWI) published, in collaboration with the German
Cooperation, a global assessment of water
resources in Jordan after a first phase of
substantial exploitation. This study is the basis
of our presentation of the water resources
(cf., figure 8), their utilization in the middle of
the 1970s, and of the changes that occurred
since the 1950s.
• Israel developed its use of the Upper
Jordan river water resources. In the
late 1950s the Israelis increased the
level and capacity of Lake Tiberius, the
only major reservoir of the area, by
raising the level of the Degania dam
(built in 1932 under 1921-Rutenburg
concession). Together with some local
uses, Israel pumped from Lake Tiberius
nearly 440 Mm3/yr (PASSIA 2001) and
started to transfer this water through its
National Water Carrier (NWC) to cities
along its Mediterranean coast and to
some irrigated schemes down to the
Negev desert, southwest of the Dead
Sea. The outflow from Lake Tiberius
thus decreased from 605 to 70 Mm3/yr
(Klein 1998), reaching the LJRB only
during winter flood flows.
• In addition, in order to preserve the
quality of Lake Tiberius water, mainly
used as a reservoir of potable water,
Israel diverted saline springs from the
north of the lake to the Lower Jordan
river downstream of the lake. At the
same time, Israelis pumped water from
the Yarmouk downstream of the intake of
the Jordanian KAC in order to fill the lake
14
FIGURE 8.
Water resources and uses pattern in the LJRB in the mid-1970s.
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Historical Background: Changes Since
1975
The exploitation of the water resources increased
sharply between 1975 and 1995, but no change
was apparent in the way water resources were
managed even if, in the beginning of the 1990s,
some evidence suggests that awareness of a
“water crisis” was developing among the users.
In the Jordan valley, irrigated agriculture was
greatly expanded through the construction of
several hydraulic facilities (doubling of the length
of the KAC, construction of secondary canals for
this new section, implementation of a pressurized
water distribution network, storage dams on the
Zarqa river and other side-wadis). All these
investments, mainly financed by international aid
during three decades, have been estimated at
US$1,500 million (Suleiman 2003; Nachbaur
2004). Moreover, because of new techniques of
production (greenhouses, drip irrigation, plastic
mulch, fertilizer, new varieties, etc.,) the
availability of the Egyptian labor force, and of
market opportunities, at least until the first gulf
war, irrigated agriculture in the Jordan valley
enjoyed a boom in production and economic
profitability described by Elmusa (1994) as the
“Super Green Revolution.”
The particular climate of the Jordan valley
allows many small entrepreneurial farmers to
produce vegetables almost all year long (and
especially during winter) as well as some fruits
withstanding the heat in summer (citrus and
bananas).
At the same time, in the highlands,
vegetables and Mediterranean fruits can be
produced all summer long. On these desert
plateaus, private wells have actually provided
“unlimited access” to good-quality groundwater
resources.12 Big and dynamic entrepreneurs have
made massive investments allowing the
development of an irrigated agriculture which
supplies Jordan and the Gulf countries with fruits
and vegetables during summer.13 In addition,
some well owners also grow orchards of olive
trees, which represent now more than half of the
irrigated area in the highlands (8,170 hectares on
a total irrigated area of 14,785 hectares [Venot
2004b]). These orchards seem to reflect the
pursuit of social prestige rather than mere
economic profitability. These plantations are, in
fact, hardly profitable (Venot 2004c);
nevertheless, they contribute greatly to depletion
of the aquifer (by about 30 Mm3/yr i.e., one-fourth
of the agricultural groundwater abstraction of the
LJRB in Jordan [Venot 2004b]) and to its
salinization, jeopardizing, therefore, the present
low-cost-domestic use which already amounts to
the usable recharge rate of the aquifer (ARD and
USAID 2001; Chebaane et al. 2004). This water
use, developed by some entrepreneurs who do
not depend on their agricultural activity, lends
itself to criticism in the present situation of
extreme scarcity, just like the artificially
12We will see in the following section that groundwater quality is now declining in some places (in particular in older irrigated areas near
urban centres [ARD 2001]), due to overexploitation of the aquifer.
13The small and middle-size Palestinian-Jordanian entrepreneurs constituted the main driving force of the rapid development of fruit
and vegetables production in the Jordan valley. In the highlands, the development of irrigation was also due to some Palestinian-
Jordanian entrepreneurs but investments have been higher (as well as the economic return [see Venot 2004]). To explain this process,
it is useful to remember the mainly rural origin of the displaced populations, the Palestinian agricultural knowledge, the technology
transfers from Israel, the willingness of the displaced populations to develop their activity of production, the existence of important
marketing-networks linked to Palestinian communities settled in the Gulf countries and, finally, the capital investment in the agriculture
sector by these communities.
Situation in the 2000s: Growing Scarcity Problems
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maintained and very profitable banana production
using large amounts of good-quality water in the
Jordan valley.14
During the same period, in order to ensure the
supply of potable water to growing cities, it was
necessary to both multiply the number of wells in
the surroundings of the cities (between 1975 and
2000, the number of wells used for domestic
purposes in the city of Amman increased from 6 to
12 [see Darmane 2004]) and mobilize new
resources to be transferred to the cities. Therefore,
in addition to the 22 Mm3 pumped every year in the
municipality, Amman now receives 32 Mm3/yr from
other wells, of which one-third comes from aquifers
outside the LJRB (Darmane 2004).15 Added to this
water coming from the highlands, another huge
transfer brings water from the KAC, in the Jordan
valley, to Amman. This transfer, initiated at the end
of the 1980s, has been developed after the
massive immigration of Jordanian-Palestinians who
were working in the Gulf countries and were forced
to leave and to come back to Jordan after the first
Gulf war (1991).16
This transfer (now reaching 50 Mm3/yr; JVA
Water Resources Department records 2004)
makes up one-third of the water supplied to
Amman and represents one-third of the water
diverted to the KAC. As irrigation in the south of
the Jordan valley was already developed (around
3,000 ha), this transfer was made possible only
because of the concomitant gradual development
of the treatment of wastewater from Amman.
Effluents are collected in the King Talal Reservoir
(KTR, capacity of 80 Mm3 [THKJ 2004] and built
in 1977) and mixed with freshwater coming from
the Zarqa river itself. This blended water has
actually replaced the freshwater initially used to
irrigate the middle and the south of the Jordan
valley (see records of JVA-Water Resources
Department).17 This transfer is facilitated by a
favorable topographical situation, allowing a
low-cost transfer of treated wastewater from the
cities to irrigated areas.
Until the mid-1990s, water was considered as
a “sleeping resource” to be found and mobilized
by ever-effective and efficient new techniques.
The fuzziness around the sharing of water
resources between the riparian countries of the
Jordan basin fueled the impression that new
resources could become available in the future.
However, with more comprehensive hydrological
knowledge and the 1994 Peace Treaty that fixed
the repartition of water resources between Israel
and Jordan, these countries and the donors
realized that the situation was more critical than
formerly envisioned. This influenced water
policymaking towards more sustainable
management of the resource.
14The cultivation of banana in the Jordan valley (1,350 ha) uses around 46 Mm3/yr of which 30 Mm3 are of best quality (banana is
highly sensitive to salt) and could be used at low cost for domestic purposes. The remaining 16 Mm3 are brackish or desalinated water
(Venot 2004) from the Jordan Valley aquifer. This cultivation has mainly been developed by some influential tribes traditionally established
in the valley, which have long controlled springs and wadis and claim historical rights to these sources. It is today by far the most
profitable crop grown in Jordan, with one of the highest water productivity (ARD 2001), but this profitability is largely artificial, due to
protective customs barriers which keep the local price of banana at a level higher than the international market price. With the entry of
Jordan to the WTO in 2000, these customs duties are likely to be dropped (even if no schedule has been negotiated yet) threatening
the economic profitability of this crop (Venot 2004).
15The main part of these “water imports” is coming from the Azraq oasis, a Ramsar site located 80 km from Amman (outside the Lower
Jordan basin). Continuous and increasing abstraction since the mid-1970s has led to a dramatic drop in the water table level and to
the almost complete disappearance of this ecosystem. Moreover, there are other transfers from the Dead Sea basin.
16This new transfer of population was due to the particular position of King Hussein of Jordan and the PLO leader Yasser Arafat, both
of whom had expressed their support to Saddam Hussein and to the invasion of Kuwait.
17At the same time, the construction of the Karamah dam in the south of the Jordan valley in the mid-1990s (completed in 1997) has
proved to be a failure ($ 77 million [Nachbaur 2004]). The reservoir was meant to store excess runoff in the rainy season for further
reuse in the valley; it actually constitutes a sink, since the water reaching it is too saline to be used in agriculture, because of both
salty groundwater infiltration and neighbouring highly saline soils. The water is thus not kept in the reservoir but released to the
Jordan river.
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Unsustainable Exploitation and
Reorientation of Water Policies
Improved knowledge of each aquifer shows that
the volumes pumped each year were, and still
are, generally much higher than the mean usable
recharge of these aquifers. At the same time, the
first abandoned areas irrigated with groundwater
from desert aquifers (e.g., in Wadi Dulheil and
Azraq) clearly show the risks and the problems
resulting from an overexploitation of these water
resources. Abstraction now largely exceeds both
the annual usable recharge by rainfall water and
also the total recharge when percolation losses
from users are added (cf., section under Refining
Water-Use Categories, p. 43). As a result there is
a quick drop of the water table as well as an
increase in salt concentration in some of these
aquifers. Observations have shown that this
increase can be due both to the intrusion of
brackish or salty water coming from more saline
neighboring aquifers and to salts mobilized by
return flows from irrigated areas (JICA 2004).
In addition, demographic growth and the
improvement in the living standards of the entire
population led, and will continue to lead, to a
strong increase in the demand for municipal
water, which is now reaching 94 lpc/day (average
for the country) (THKJ 2004).18 This will require
the development of new water resources.19
Furthermore, the costs (investment, operation and
maintenance [O&M]) of urban water supply have
strongly increased (Abu-Shams 2003; Darmane
2004). In order to meet the growing needs of the
urban population, it is now necessary to resort to
energy-consuming transfers over longer distances
and to elevate water several hundred meters
(1,200 m from the Jordan valley up to the
highlands or from 200–600 m in deep wells), to
develop water reuse (McCornick et al. 2002), and
establish desalination plants (see Scott et al.
2003).
Moreover, it is worth noting that agriculture,
which enjoyed very favorable conditions during
the 1970s and the 1980s, and which was strongly
supported by the government because it allowed
rapid and economically viable local development
and the settlement of nomadic populations, uses
today a large share of national water resources.
Agriculture employs 5 percent of the labor force,
produces only 3 to 4 percent of the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), but indirectly
contributes to nearly 29 percent of the GDP
(Ministry of Planning 1999), when all
agriculture-related activities are computed. The
sector makes up 65 percent of the national water
use (i.e., 511 Mm3/yr in 2002, including 71 Mm3/yr
of treated wastewater [THKJ 2004]). This is a
common situation due to the large amount of
water needed for crop production and to the
relatively undeveloped nature of the other sectors,
but these percentages signal that, because of the
overall limited amount of water available, more
inter-sectoral transfers are forthcoming.
Faced with such problems and the evidence of
a growing overall scarcity, the Government of
Jordan, supported by international partners strongly
involved in the water-sector’s investments, has
tried to critically reorient its water policy. The main
lines of this new policy are:
Institutions and Policies
• Official publication of the government
priorities and objectives in the Jordan’s
Water Strategy Policies of 1995 and
1997: where priority is given to potable
water, then to industrial use and finally to
irrigation water.
• The concentration of the responsibilities
for the public management of the entire
sector within the MWI (Ministry of Water
and Irrigation).
18Darmane (2004) presents a figure included between 115 and 150 lpc/day for the capital Amman.
19Prospective presented in THKJ (2004) has been done to allow a municipal water consumption of 150 lpc/day.
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Supply Augmentation
The planning of a set of new projects aiming at
mobilizing the last available resources: dams,
transfers, reuse, and desalination.
Actions Aiming at Reducing Agricultural Water
Consumption
• Freezing of well-drilling authorizations in
1992.
• Initiation of a control of water pumped
from aquifers (installation of water meters
in 1994 and groundwater-control by law in
2002, establishing a taxation on the
volume pumped).
• Modernization of the irrigation systems in
the Jordan valley (shift from a distribution
system by open channel to an
underground pressurized network,
completed in 1996).
• Replacement of freshwater used in
irrigation with blended treated wastewater
coming from the KTR in order to irrigate
the middle and the south of the Jordan
valley.
• Since 1998, a reduction of the annual
water quotas allocated to farmers in the
Jordan valley has been introduced,
according to the quantity of the resources
available in the country each year.
• Compensation by the government to
farmers for letting their land fallow in
order to reduce the demand for and the
consumption of irrigation water in the
Jordan valley during dry years (1,000 ha
for a value of US$ [hereafter, $] 0.4
million in 2001).
• Development of applied research and
technical assistance to farmers
(American, German and French
cooperation, among others).
Actions Aiming at a Better Management of
Urban Water Supply
• Rehabilitation of the network of Greater-
Amman (investment of $250 million in the
2003–2006 period) in order to reduce the
large leakages which amounted to 30
percent of the water delivered.
• Transfer of the management of urban
water supply for Amman city to a private
company in an attempt to improve
distribution and control over the network,
and to increase bill recovery (reduction of
unaccounted-for water). The reliability of
the distribution has considerably
increased as well as the percentage of
bill recovery, but losses are still very high
because of the dilapidated state of the
network.
Water Resources and Uses in the
2000s
The main modifications that occurred between the
middle of the 1970s and the 2000s are shown in
figure 9 and include the following:
• Reduction of the water coming from the
Yarmouk and reaching the LJRB. During
the 1980s, 35 middle-size dams were
built in the Upper Yarmouk basin in Syria.
Direct pumping in the rivers and wells for
agricultural and urban purposes has
developed significantly. The Syrian
utilization of the Yarmouk has thus more
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than doubled within the period to reach
200 Mm3/yr (El-Nasser 1998). The
Yarmouk flow, before its partial diversion
into the KAC and to Israel, reaches 270
Mm3/yr (THKJ 2004), of which about 110
Mm3/yr flow uncontrolled to the Lower
Jordan river.
• In 1994, Jordan and Israel signed a
peace treaty, defining the sharing of
common water resources. The prevailing
Israeli utilization of the Yarmouk water
(local use and diversion by pumping to
Lake Tiberius in winter) was recognized
and remains unchanged (70 Mm3/yr)—(El-
Nasser 1998; Hof 1998). Moreover, Israel
pumps 25 Mm3/yr in winter from the
Yarmouk and gives back the same
amount to the KAC during the year, which
allows a certain degree of regulation of
the canal inflow.20 Moreover, according to
the treaty, Israel, after desalinating the 20
Mm3/yr coming from saline springs and
presently diverted to the Lower Jordan
river, should transfer 10 additional Mm3/yr
to Jordan. Another 50 Mm3/yr of
freshwater should also come from
common projects to be defined. These
two points have not been implemented
yet and in compensation, Israel has been
transferring 20 Mm3/yr (added to the 25
Mm3/yr returned in summer) of freshwater
from Lake Tiberius to Jordan since 1998
(Peace Treaty between Jordan and Israel
1994; Beaumont 1997).
• Extension to the south of the KAC by 18
km between 1975 and 1978 and by 14.5
km in 1988. Only an additional area of
3,400 hectares has been newly irrigated,
thanks in particular to the use of blended
freshwater/wastewater (50 Mm3/yr of such
water are now used in the southern
Jordan valley [JVA-records], i.e., one-third
of the water used in the south of the
valley, this amount is increasing each
year). Due to lack of water, an area of
5,100 hectares, already equipped with an
irrigation network, is still not put to use.
• Optimization of the efficiency and of the
control of the distribution of water to
irrigated farms, through the construction
of an underground pressurized pipe
network.
• Building of dams on the Zarqa river and
other side-wadis in order to control the
surface water and irrigate new schemes.
Little water still reaches the Jordan river
in winter.21
• While groundwater use was already
significant in the mid-1970s, most deep
wells (85%) were dug between 1975 and
1992 (BGR-WAJ 1994). Agricultural
20However, it is worth noting that this part of the treaty raised some problems since the water pumped by Israel from the Yarmouk in
winter is of very high quality, while the water returned from Lake Tiberius to the KAC in summer is, on the contrary, of poor quality.
21The total capacity of the reservoirs is evaluated at 165 Mm3 (THKJ 2004).
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• Total groundwater exploitation in the basin
officially reaches 240 Mm3/yr (to which 30
Mm3/yr of groundwater imports from other
basins must be added), compared with an
annual usable recharge of 160 Mm3/yr.
This means an overexploitation rate of
150 percent on average on the LJRB
(MWI-records), which seems to be an
under-evaluation of the actual figure (our
calculations based on a local abstraction
of 275 Mm3/yr gave a rate of 180%, see
footnote 22).
Decline in quality and quantity of the water
reaching the Dead Sea has reduced its inflow to
only 20 percent of the historical flow of the
Jordan river. Only the Yarmouk river and some
side-wadis, mainly in the north of the basin, still
feed, in winter, the Lower Jordan river. In addition,
this latter only receives polluted and salty water
(water from saline springs diverted by Israel,
drainage waters from the irrigated perimeters and
wastewater from Israeli colonies and Palestinian
and Jordanian villages or cities).
groundwater use in the basin would thus
reach 109 Mm3/yr in the 2000s (records
of the MWI-Water Resources Department
for the year 2003) to irrigate around
15,000 hectares.22
• Urban population within the basin has
been multiplied roughly by 2.5 in 25 years
(1975–2000—THKJ, DoS 1978, 2003).
Urban groundwater use (domestic and
industrial water) has, in parallel, grown
fivefold to now reach 150 Mm3/yr (records
of the MWI-Water Resources
Department).
• Within this amount, 20 Mm3/yr come from
neighboring basins located at 50–100 km
of the large urban areas of the LJRB in
Jordan.
• Since the beginning of the 1990s, a set
of pumping stations allow the transfer of
50 Mm3/yr from the middle of the valley
to Amman.
22The volumes presented here are official figures from the MWI for the year 2003 and are split amongt the different basin as follow: 58
Mm3/yr for the Amman-Zarqa basin, 29 Mm3/yr for the Yarmouk basin; 18 Mm3/yr for the Jordan valley basin and 4 Mm3/yr for the side-
wadis groundwater basin. These figures may, however, be questioned due to, among other things, the unreliable functioning and
readings of the water meters installed on the agricultural wells.
Field surveys (Venot 2004), crop requirement evaluations (FAO 1977; THKJ 2004) as well as the estimation of irrigated areas in the
highlands of the basin (Venot 2004) lead to an estimate of total agricultural groundwater abstraction in the Amman-Zarqa and the
Yarmouk basins of 75 and 35 Mm3/yr respectively (i.e., 110 Mm3/yr [Venot 2004]). For the Amman-Zarqa basin, ARD (2001) and
Chebaane (2004) present a comparable figure of 70 Mm3/yr for agricultural groundwater abstraction within this basin. Since no other
figures concerning the Jordan valley and the side-wadis basin are available, we will consider THKJ (2004) figures.
Considering the figures given for M&I abstraction as accurate, these new evaluations of agricultural abstraction and the annual
recharges presented in THKJ (2004), the effective overexploitation of the Amman-Zarqa aquifer would thus represent 250 percent of
the annual usable recharge instead of the 216 percent announced, and this overexploitation would reach 117 percent instead of 100
percent of the annual recharge of the Yarmouk basin (return flows not considered in this calculation). This leads to an overall abstraction
of 180 percent for the entire Lower Jordan basin (abstraction of 275 Mm3/yr).
However, these rates of overabstraction are calculated based on the ‘usable recharge’, i.e.; the recharge by rainfall minus the baseflow.
If we now consider return flows from irrigation (efficiency of 80%) and cities (efficiency of 70%), the abstraction decreases respectively
to 161 percent and 85 percent of the annual usable recharge of the Amman-Zarqa and Yarmouk basins. This evaluation leads to an
overall abstraction equivalent to 120 percent of the annual usable recharge of the LJRB (abstraction of 185 Mm3/yr).
Notes: 1. The definition of the overdraft based on annual recharge is problematic. Part of the recharge returns to the surface through
springs or baseflow and abstractions at the level of the recharge are likely to have severe impact on these flows. The
notion of safe yield is very fuzzy and not employed here. We compare here abstractions with the usable recharge but this
does not mean that a rate of 100 percent is optimum or sustainable. Much uncertainty remains on the water balances since
aquifers are not in a static state of equilibrium and the dynamics of aquifer de-stockage, as well as their impact on base
flows, cannot be fully predicted.
2. If we consider that the 20 Mm3/yr abstracted from the Mukheibeh wells are abstracted from the Yarmouk aquifer, the
balance of this aquifer is more worrying since overabstraction would reach 169 percent and 135 percent, with and without
computing the return flows.
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FIGURE 9.
Water resources and uses in the LJRB in the 2000s.
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This section presents the main problems the
Jordanian water sector is now facing, as well as
their possible consequences for the near future. It
also mentions some issues which are not yet of
immediate concern but which will have to be
addressed in the future. The following issues are
to acquire increased relevance by the year 2025:
• The physical scarcity of water resources.
• Population growth. The rapid increase in
water needs (due to an improvement in
living standards and to a still high
demographic growth of 2.8% [THKJ, DoS
2003]),23 notably in urban needs (the
cities concentrate nearly 80% of the
population [THKJ, DoS 2003]).
• Growing cost of supply. The ever-
increasing costs of the necessary
mobilization of supplementary water
resources, supported until now by the
government24 and international aid
(expensive dams, long-distance transfers,
elevation costs, desalination, etc., see
Kolars 1992; GTZ 1998; Nachbaur 2004)
but which may have, in the next
decades, to be increasingly borne by the
population (the present financing being
unsustainable in the long term), with
possible impact on the poorest
households of the Jordanian society (see
Darmane 2004 for some clues in the
Amman’s area).
• Groundwater control. The overexploitation
of aquifers and the decline of their
quality. Irrigated agriculture, in particular,
leads to a deterioration in their quality
(induced salinization, nitrates, etc.,) and
thus jeopardizes the possible future use
by cities of this high-quality and low-cost
water. At the same time, little is really
done to substantially decrease
groundwater agricultural use in the private
wells located in the highlands (abstraction
limits have never been respected and too
many licenses had been issued until
1992 [ARD 2001; Venot 2004b]).
• Growing vulnerability to droughts. The
unchallenged policy of transferring
increasing freshwater volumes from
irrigated agriculture to urban uses, affects
the stability of the agriculture sector.
During dry years (2000 to 2002), for
example, the Jordanian government froze
the quantity of water reserved for cities,
while drastically reducing the amount
allocated to agriculture in the Jordan
valley.
• Modernization and maintenance. Several
measures have, however, already been
taken to improve the management of
water in the country. This includes, for
example, modernization and physical
improvement of the networks, reduction
of the volumes of water unaccounted for,
23Even if a slowdown in population growth is now perceptible, the DoS presents an average of 2.9 percent for the period 1997-2003,
that puts Jordan among the 12 countries with the highest population growth rate in the world. The natural growth rate (immigration
excluded) is evaluated at about 2.4 percent. On the other hand, a figure of 3.6 percent is often referred to (El-Naser 1998; JRVIP
2001; Al-Jayyousi 2003), to evaluate total population growth in Jordan during the same period (which puts Jordan just after the Gaza
Strip in terms of total population growth).
24The cumulated deficit of the Jordanian water sector corresponding to the amount of money invested (construction of water facilities,
subsidies on water prices, etc.), due to public deficit, has been evaluated by the World Bank (1997) at $476 million in 1995 and has
been increasing since then at an average rate of $90 million/year (i.e., 0.9% of the GDP) (Central Bank of Jordan quarterly reports).
Emerging Problems in 2000-2025 and Expected Evolutions
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transfer of Amman water supply and
wastewater collection to a private
company (Darmane 2004).25 Such
privatization would also probably bring
benefits to the irrigated schemes of the
Jordan valley now managed by a public
service. However, partly because of the
highly subsidized water prices, expected
benefits are probably too low for a private
company to invest in such a venture. In
addition, as seen earlier, modern
techniques allowing high efficiency of
distribution always incur high O&M costs,
which have to be borne either by users or
by the government. However, until now,
for both urban and irrigation supply,
emphasis has been placed in obtaining
international funding for implementing
modern systems, while O&M recurring
costs have been disregarded. The
financing of O&M has always been
minimal (and mainly borne by the public
sector), resulting in degradation. There is
a clear need for closely considering the
O&M of these systems, notably if their
efficiency is to be maintained.
• Health and environmental hazards. Apart
from the problem of unsustainability
associated with the overexploitation of the
aquifers, other environmental problems
have to be underlined. These include
health hazards linked to a generalized use
of treated wastewater in agriculture, the
decrease in the Dead Sea level (one meter
per year during the last decade [1995-
2004]), the disappearance of the Azraq
oasis, as well as the contamination of
groundwater and surface water.
The future of irrigated agriculture raises a
complex set of technical, social and
economic questions:
• Redefine agriculture in the highlands.
Irrigated agriculture in the highlands has
mainly developed during the last three
decades because of large private
investments (minimum of $200,000 per
farm of 20 hectares on average for the
well, pump, irrigation system, fences,
houses and often orchards). The 500 to
1,000 investors concerned belong to the
high society (deputies, senators,
entrepreneurs, sheikhs, etc.,) their social
importance and their influence on
government decisions suggest that all the
measures aiming at reducing their water
use will be conflict-prone and will take
long to implement.
• Degradation of water quality. The situation
in the southern Jordan valley, which
receives blended fresh/treated wastewater
from Amman instead of freshwater
coming from the north (now transferred to
the capital), is expected to be extended
to the whole Jordan valley during the next
decade (see McCornick et al. 2002; MWI/
JVA 2002; MWI/WAJ 2004). A degradation
of the agricultural water quality will follow
and will generate a complex array of
problems: workers’ and consumers’
contamination, soil degradation, clogging-
up of irrigation system emitters,
disappearance of certain sensitive crops
(strawberries, beans, citrus, etc.,
[FORWARD 1999; Grattan 2001;
McCornick et al. 2002]), consumer’s lack
of confidence in the quality of the
products, drop in prices, and loss of some
export markets. On the other hand,
effluents from the cities (and notably from
the Amman-Zarqa urban areas) negatively
impact the quality of surface water,
creating problems for agricultural areas,
notably along the Zarqa river (ARD 2001).
25Recently, some drawbacks concerning the process of privatization have been noticed at the national level. For example, it is likely
that a public company will replace the private one in charge of the management of Amman’s water utilities after 2006 (when the
current contract will be over), while another is to manage the water supply in Aqaba. At the same time, several privatizations projected
have been delayed (notably the one concerning the privatization of JVA in the northern directorate).
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• Declining profitability. While allocation of
freshwater to the Jordan valley has
already decreased, prices of water have
increased (even if they still remain very
low)26 but yet never constituted, until now,
a real handicap for agricultural production
in the Jordan valley. Marketing actually
constitutes the main problem faced by
producers (ASAL 1994; World Bank
1999). Jordanian irrigated agriculture has
mainly developed during a period (1975–
1990) of strong regional demand for fresh
products. These products could be sold
for high prices because of the payment
capacity of the gulf countries (oil booms
of 1973 and 1979) and of the lack of real
competition, notably in winter (production
in the valley) and in summer (production
in the highlands). At this time, the
necessary investments (greenhouses,
irrigation systems, wells, equipment,
etc.,) assured a handsome return within a
few years (Venot 2004c) and a lot of
investors invested in agricultural activities
because of a profitability that was among
the highest in all economic sectors. After
1985, the quick development of
production in Jordan and in the region
(citrus in Syria, vegetables in Syria,
Lebanon and Gulf countries) led to a drop
in prices and in the profitability of
investments (Nachbaur 2004; Venot
2004b). Moreover, the first Gulf war of
1991 worsened this situation since the
Gulf markets, which constituted a major
outlet for Jordanian products (THKJ, DoS
records) were lost (Fitch 2001; Jabarin
2001) as a result of the Jordanian support
for the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. The
profitability of the Jordanian agriculture
sector has thus decreased since the
beginning of the 1990s and this decrease
might become more pronounced in the
near future, strongly affecting farms’
profitability and farmers’ revenue.
• Threat to the trade balance. Because of
particular climatic conditions, irrigated
agriculture has allowed the development
of an important production of fruits and
vegetables, and their exports now
represent, on average, 12 percent of the
value of Jordanian exports (MoA 2001).
Due to the strategic social and economic
nature of these agricultural exports, any
reduction of the production will raise
macro-economic questions. If imports of
cereals (sometimes defined as “virtual
water” [Allan 2002]) have never been a
controversial issue in Jordan,27
maintaining the export of high-value crops
produced in the Jordan valley seems
essential to stabilize the trade balance,28
which shows a sharp deficit in a country
with only a few natural resources (potash
and phosphates of the Dead Sea) and
with an economy mainly based on
services.
• Vegetable/fruit local markets. Moreover,
Jordanians are big consumers of fresh
vegetables (tomatoes, cucumber,
eggplant, zucchini, onion, etc.,) all year
long. Therefore, it is necessary to
maintain a production oriented towards
the local market, notably in the Jordan
26Water fees in the Jordan valley amount to $0.02/m3 of water supplied, i.e., about one-third of the O&M costs of the network.
27In areas where rain-fed cereals can be grown, possible improvements in term of yields and volume are very limited. On the other
hand, the development of irrigated cereals has always been limited, the preference being given to vegetables and fruits.
28Based on figures of the Department of Statistics, exports coming from the Jordan valley account for 66 percent of the total vegetables
and for 40 percent of the total fruits exported from Jordan; the rest is exported from the highlands.
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valley.29 Every drastic reduction in local
production would actually lead to an
increase in the local prices of these
common products. If this could have a
(limited) positive impact on the
profitability of agriculture it will also
negatively affect the budget of the
poorest families.
• Free trade. Jordan has favored the
development of new economic sectors
(tourism, services, and industry) and
signed several agreements,30 which could
lead during the next decade to a
reappraisal of the profitability of certain
agricultural productions still protected in
Jordan (e.g., bananas and apples).
• Impact on labor force. Another important
social problem is the fact that two-thirds
of the workers in the agriculture sector
are migrants, mainly coming from Egypt,
and that the majority of the entrepreneurs
are of Palestinian origin. It allows some
groups of the Jordanian society to argue
that the social impact of a drastic
reduction of irrigated agriculture would
only have little impact on the “Jordanian
society.” 31
• The illusion of cheap water. Up to now,
public agencies have never implemented
the laws aiming at a reduction of
agricultural groundwater abstraction by
private wells (quotas, taxes if the quota
is exceeded, etc.,) while this could have
been possible because of the
generalization of water meters on the
wells from 1994 onwards.32 Owners of
private wells in Jordan consider that they
own the resources they use and, through
their political influence, manage to
obviate the government measures which
could affect them. In addition, because of
the lack of fines for the use of private
wells 33 and of highly subsidized water
prices in the Jordan valley, farmers only
bear a limited share of the abstraction
and exploitation costs of water,
strengthening the illusion of the
availability of low-cost water.
Projections by the Mid-2020s
Scenarios Considered in Our Projections at the
2025 Horizon
Several investment and reform projects have
been floated in order to meet and to satisfy the
increasing urban water needs within the country
during the next 25 years. Some of them have
already been initiated (2004) or are in their final
phase of implementation or definition. We present
here a projection for 2025 considering projects
that are already implemented or under way (in
2004) and those that seem to be the most likely
implemented in the near future (see figure 10).
Construction of the Last Reservoirs. The last
reservoirs which are likely to be built (along the
side-wadis) are generally far from consumption
29Intensive irrigated agriculture in the Jordan valley seems to us to be less questionable than in the highlands mainly because it uses
renewable surface water. Some problems of irrigated agriculture in the Jordan valley have however to be considered, including water
pollution by nitrates and soils degradation (Orthofer 2001; Orthofer and Loibl 2002).
30The WTO, Jordan-UE Agreement, Great Arab Free Trade establishing a free trade area between the Arab states and several
bilateral agreements, notably with the USA and Israel.
31This discourse opposes the “true Jordanian society” composed of inhabitants of the former Transjordan (east bank of the Jordan
river) to foreigners (Egyptian, Syrian migrants) and Palestinians (either refugees, displaced or even with the Jordanian nationality).
32The example of the Underground Water Control By-Law No. (85) of 2002 is noteworthy since it is the first attempt to make the
farmers pay for the water they abstract above a certain limit. Even if the expected decrease in agricultural abstraction is to be limited,
the first bills have been sent to farmers on the April 1, 2004, opening the way to an effective water taxation (Venot 2004).
33Two-thirds of the licenses issued until 1992 included clauses on abstraction limits at 50,000 or 75,000 m3/year/well (Fitch 2001)
which have never been enforced.
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centers, smaller and expensive, with the
exception of the Jordanian-Syrian dam (Unity or
Wehdah dam) whose construction has been
delayed by the opposition of the Israelis until the
Israeli-Jordan Peace Treaty of 1994.
In our projections, we consider the
construction of the Wehdah dam (also called
Unity dam; storage of 110 Mm3 annual inflow of
85 Mm3/yr [THKJ 2004]) which began in April
2004, as well as the construction of smaller
storage facilities on the remaining non-controlled
side-wadis and on neighboring rivers located out
of the basin (Wadi Mujib, 35 Mm3/yr).34
The consequence will be a nearly complete
disappearance of the Lower Jordan river flow
(Wehdah dam) as well as lateral flows (Mujib
dam) reaching the Dead Sea, and the availability
of new freshwater resources diverted mostly to
cities (according to the governmental plans: 60
Mm3/yr for Irbid and the other northern cities and
65 Mm3/yr for Amman-Zarqa).
Consequently, the volumes diverted to
irrigated agriculture within the Jordan valley will
remain stable but the regulation of the KAC’s flow
and the flexibility allowed by the Wehdah dam will
allow an improved fine-tuning of irrigation supply,
but might also have an impact on soil salinization
(McCornick et al. 2001).35
Development of Long-distance Interbasin
Transfers. In the Jordanian situation of extreme
scarcity, large transfers have long been
envisaged (transfer of freshwater from Lebanon,
Iraq and Syria; transfer of saline water from the
Mediterranean Sea to the Dead Sea [GTZ 1998])
but these transfers have never been implemented
because of the regional political instability and of
their very high costs in terms of investment and
O&M.
On the other hand, transfers within the basin
and from neighboring basins, located in Jordan,
are already developed (transfers from the Azraq
and the Dead Sea) and should, in the mid-term,
decline because of the general overexploitation of
these basins.
In our projections for the 2025 horizon, we
have considered, as part of a policy aiming at
reducing the overexploitation of the renewable
aquifers, that the transfers from the Azraq and
southern basins (Dead Sea basin notably) could
be discontinued or reduced (as presented in
THKJ 2004).
On the other hand, a large transfer from the
fossil aquifer of Disi, located about 300 km south
of Amman, is envisaged and a Build Operate and
Transfer (BOT) scheme is presently considered.36
It is foreseen that 50 Mm3/yr could be transferred
to Amman in a 50-year period while the present
(2000) private utilization of the Disi aquifer for
local agricultural irrigation in the midst of the
desert (50 Mm3/yr MWI-Water Resources
Department records) would be stopped or at least
strongly decreased (and limited to fruit trees). The
governmental decision to exploit this strategic
fossil aquifer illustrates the severity of the
problems to be solved in Jordan in the short
term.
Finally, all the new projects (desalinization
plants, new dams, and water reuse) would also
need high investments in terms of pipes, pumping
stations and other facilities allowing the transfer
of water.
34The construction of this dam was completed in 2004.
35The management of the canal water depends essentially on the Yarmouk flow: some wasting of water generally occurs in winter
when the crop requirements are low and the resources abundant (but uncontrolled flows in winter can also be useful for leaching the
soils in off-seasons as shown by McCornick et al. [2001]). On the other hand, there are periods when water is lacking, notably at the
end of the spring and the beginning of autumn when farmers’ needs are high. The control of the Yarmouk flows by the Wehdah dam
will allow a more “on-demand” management, which should both allow meeting agricultural needs and optimizing the resources use.
36The Government of Jordan is now studying the different offers received from private companies but recent evolutions seem to show
that none of these offers is satisfactory. It is thus possible that the idea of a BOT scheme will be given up and that the government
will invite tenders for this huge water transfer.
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Development of Brackish and Seawater
Desalinization. In 2004, an important desalination
plant of the brackish groundwater of the Jordan
valley (Deir Allah, 15 Mm3/yr [MWI 2002]) was
implemented and is already supplying Amman
with 10 Mm3/yr.
Some others smaller reverse-osmosis plants
have also been developed during the years 2000-
2005  in areas where groundwater is brackish, in
order to supply cities with potable water as well
as to develop agricultural activities in the south of
the Jordan valley (private facilities, essentially for
banana cultivation). We consider in our
projections that these plants will be still in use in
the mid-2020s.
We also consider in our projections some
large projects of desalination of saline springs
(Zara-Maïn, 35 Mm3/yr under construction [MWI
2002]) and of brackish aquifers in the Jordan
valley (Hisban, 10 Mm3/yr to be developed within
the next decade). Moreover, we consider that
Israel, in compliance with the 1994-Peace Treaty,
will desalinate the 20 Mm3/yr it now dumps into
the Jordan valley and will transfer half of this
volume to Jordan.
The Red Sea-Dead Sea Project (Red-Dead). This
project consists of the huge transfer of seawater
from the Dead Sea to the Red Sea (difference in
altitude of 400 meters, distance of 180 km). It is
intended to stabilize the Dead Sea level (see
evolution of the water level in figure 11) by
transferring into it a volume close to that
historically brought by the Jordan river (between
800 and 1,000 Mm3/yr). A bigger transfer is, in
fact, planned (1,500 Mm3/yr in total) in order to
supply the main cities of Jordan, Palestine and
Israel with some seawater which would be
desalinated on the shores of the Dead Sea using
the electricity produced because of the natural
difference in altitude (Harza 1998).
In addition, the tourist activity in the area is
to be strongly developed due to the importance of
the site for the main monotheist religions and to
the medicinal value of the Dead Sea mud. The
project would, therefore, also benefit this activity
and allow its development. The capital required is
estimated at $1,000 to 1,500 million for the
seawater transfer, and at $3,500 million for the
desalinization and freshwater transfer facilities
(Harza 1998). The magnitude of these
investments as well as the involvement of the
three political entities concerned (Israel, Jordan,
Palestinian territories) requires regional
collaboration and a strong support from the
international community. The project, in fact, has
been presented, for the first time, by a bipartite
committee (Jordan and Israel) during the Earth
Summit for a Sustainable Development in
Johannesburg in 2002. The World Bank has been
appointed to draft the term of references for the
feasibility study by a tripartite committee (Jordan,
Israel and Palestinian Authority) and the study is
seen by the international community as a means
to contribute to the Peace Process in the region.
Due to the scope of the project and to the
time needed for its implementation, we have
considered in our projection for 2025 that only the
first step would be implemented with the
production of 100 Mm3/yr of desalinated water
(against a prevision of 570 Mm3/yr of desalinated
water for Jordan at the last stage of the project
[Harza 1998]).
In spite of its high costs (desalination,
elevation and transfer), this technical solution is
already the main option considered today to solve
or at least to alleviate the freshwater scarcity
problem in Jordan in the mid- and long-term.
Expansion of Treated Wastewater Use in Irrigated
Agriculture. It is forecasted that in 2025 Amman
will produce twice as much wastewater as in
2000 (100 Mm3/yr). In our projections, we
consider that this wastewater, blended in the KTD
with freshwater coming from the Zarqa river, will
be used in the south of the valley (allowing,
therefore, irrigation of all the area which can be
potentially irrigated) and in the highlands mainly
for industrial purposes (25 to 30 Mm3/yr as
mentioned in the THKJ 2004) around wastewater
treatment plants, instead of using freshwater from
aquifers.
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FIGURE 10.
Projected situation of water use patterns by the mid-2020s.
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We also considered that 25 Mm3/yr of treated
wastewater would be available in the northern
cities of Jordan and would be blended in the KAC
with water coming from the Yarmouk in order to
irrigate the schemes of the northern Jordan valley
(McCornick et al. 2002).37 This would
counterbalance the increasing freshwater transfers
from the Jordan valley to Amman that have been
estimated at 90 Mm3/yr in the mid-2020s.
Reduction of Agricultural Groundwater Use. In
order to reach a sustainable level of groundwater
exploitation (88 Mm3/yr in the Amman-Zarqa
basin, for example, [see ARD 2001; MWI-Water
Resources Department]), it would be necessary,
at the current level of urban uses, to stop all
agricultural groundwater use.
This scenario is highly improbable since it
seems unlikely that from a role of producer-
exporter of fresh products in summer, Jordan will
become a net importer of these products during
this period of the year. Moreover, the importance
of the sociopolitical impacts of such a shift
suggests that the policies needed to reduce
irrigated agriculture in the highlands (and notably
the export-oriented one) will be delayed and only
partially implemented.
On the other hand, the increase in the aquifer
salinity could lead, in the mid to long term, to a
reduction of irrigated agriculture in the highlands
since some of the crops planted (grapes and
apples) are salt-sensitive and would thus become
nonviable (Grattan 2001).
In our projection to 2025 we have envisaged
an average scenario for the entire society,
whereby the irrigated areas would be reduced by
two-thirds in the Yarmouk basin and by 30
percent in the Amman-Zarqa basin by 2025
(1,500 and 9,300 ha, consuming 10 and 50
Mm3/yr of groundwater, respectively, to which
must be added 30 Mm3/yr of treated wastewater
in the Amman-Zarqa basin).38
Hints for Future Policies
Supply Augmentation: Reopening the Basin. Until
now, meeting the water needs of the Jordanian
society, which has one of the lowest per capita
domestic water consumption in the world (94 lpc/
day [THKJ 2004]), has been done because of an
ever-increasing development of water production
and use. Diverse technical solutions were
successively implemented: earth and masonry
canals, dams, pumps, canalization and
pressurized irrigation networks, deep wells, long
distance transfers, increasing use of marginal
quality water (brackish and treated wastewater)
and desalination.
Today, some technical solutions allowing an
increase in water supply are still available but
these options have very high investment and
operational costs. The epitome of these solutions
is the project of transferring seawater from the
Red Sea to the Dead Sea. This project should
allow, in the long run, to eventually increase by
one half the total available freshwater resources
in Jordan and to replenish the Dead Sea with
seawater. A total of 810 Mm3/yr would be
desalinated for domestic purposes but the
production costs of this water (delivered to
Amman) would, however, be at least five times
higher than the present costs of potable water,
because of the huge facilities to be built.
Because of the regional political situation,
and as it has always been the case, the
investments needed will probably be facilitated by
international aid or funding agencies. However,
the O&M costs of such facilities would certainly
37THKJ (2004) in this Scenario 1 presents that 230 Mm3/yr of treated waste water will be available in 2020 in Jordan while 155 Mm3/yr
will be reused both in industry (30 Mm3/yr) and in irrigation (125 Mm3/yr) (the remaining being lost in transfer and storage).
38It is worth noting the decrease in agricultural groundwater abstraction projected in the next 20 years is very limited and does not
allow a return to a sustainable rate of groundwater abstraction. For example in the Amman-Zarqa basin, the abstraction is projected
to reach about 140 Mm3/yr i.e., 207 percent of the annual recharge of this aquifer. To reduce further the present agricultural abstraction,
stronger measures would have to be enforced, notably to limit the areas planted with irrigated olive trees which presently consume
about 30 Mm3/yr (for about 8,170 ha).
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have to be borne by the water users and not only
by the government which has already strongly
subsidized the sector at the cost of an
ever-increasing public deficit.
Sectoral Competition. Irrigated agriculture
consumes two-thirds of the national water
resources (THKJ 2004) and competes with the
domestic and industrial uses, which are the
priority of the government (HKJ/MWI 1997b). This
competition might be more crucial for agriculture
than for the M&I sector, since the latter is indeed
being given priority, with an increasing part of the
Yarmouk flow transferred to the highlands. The
competition manifests itself not so much in terms
of present allocation (since a diminution of the
water used by agriculture in the valley or in the
highlands would not readily increase supply to
M&I uses), but rather in terms of future use. The
actual overdraft of the aquifers decreases the
resources potentially available for future urban
use and implies that more costly alternative
resources must be tapped.39 Groundwater overuse
within the basin also causes degradation of the
groundwater resources both in the short term
(direct pollution due to infiltration of pesticides
and fertilizers as shown by JICA (2004) and in
the long term (salinization of water due to a
decline of water tables) and thus jeopardizes
future low-cost use for domestic purposes.
Another aspect of this sectoral competition is
the growing vulnerability of agriculture to climatic
vagaries. As the residual water user, agriculture in
the valley bears the brunt of the variability in
supply, as priority is given to cities in time of
drought. Compensation measures for fallowing
land or in case of reduced supply need to be
considered in order to avoid financial and
livelihood breakdowns. This would be tantamount
to recognizing a water right for the valley and
would help weather the impact of reallocation.
Reorientation of Agriculture. Jordan’s continued
protection of its banana production, and its
support to “luxurious” irrigation of olive trees with
high-quality water in desert areas, incur a cost to
society and may obstruct the development of
alternatives crops that might yield higher
aggregate benefits (e.g., date palm in the valley,
which has the advantage for being a low water
consumer, and relatively salt-resistant crop
[Grattan 2001; McCornick et al. 2003] and highly
profitable [Venot 2004c]). Moreover, the price of
water remains also quite low for both agricultural
and urban uses: only one-third of the O&M costs
is recovered in the valley (government subsidies).
Taxing the use of groundwater in the highlands
might also be instrumental in reducing aquifer
overdraft (Venot 2004c).
Until now, except for the public schemes in
the valley, irrigated agriculture in Jordan has
developed through private investments with no
public subsidies, excluding the reduction of
energy costs. However, public intervention is
needed to partly reorient irrigated agriculture
towards more socially and economically adapted
productions, instead of preserving the gains of
some influential social groups. This intervention
could have the form of some compensation for:
a) giving up the production of some fruits (olives);
b) a support to modernization of irrigation and
cropping techniques; c) an increase in
groundwater fees; d) a suspension of protection
from customs and subsidies on electricity for
agricultural pumping; and e) a buy-out of wells.
Such measures, however, are likely to be delayed
due to sociopolitical deadlocks recurrently
blocking governmental decisions. Most of the
measures presented here have been considered
in national policies for at least 10 years or
recommended by several studies (HKJ/MWI
1997b, HKJ/MWI 1998b, 1998c, 1998d; ARD
2001; JICA 2004) but they have not yet been
implemented, or only partially implemented with
mixed results.
Demand Management. Raising awareness of
water problems and encouraging conservation are
39It must be said, however, that even a drastic curtailment of groundwater use by, say, 30 Mm3/yr would only ease the problem of
urban use for a decade or so but would not radically alter the longer-term picture.
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a must. Although the awareness of water
problems has greatly increased within the
Jordanian society in the past few years, these
problems are still insufficiently comprehended by
the majority of the population, which still often
focuses on the consequences of the creation of
the State of Israel on Jordanian water resources.
These consequences are only one of the
underlying factors of the Jordanian water crisis
but, acting as an emotional catalyst, they hide
some of the deeper internal causes, ignored or
even denied by the entire society.
An issue that commonly comes along with
water scarcity is that of efficiency in water use.
Unaccounted for water, which includes losses by
leakage, was around 50 percent and is supposed
to have been reduced to around 30 percent in
Amman, after network rehabilitation and better
management. Demand in urban areas can also
probably be partly managed with a rise in prices.
Agriculture is also often designated as a wasteful
user and low efficiencies of irrigation networks are
reported. The following section looks at aspects of
water use at the basin level by calculating the
terms of the water accounting for the different
periods, and concludes by a reflection on irrigation
and water use efficiency. However desirable
demand management may be, it is also necessary
to acknowledge that its scope is too limited to
provide long-term solutions to water scarcity.
Water Accounting of the LJRB: Historical Trends
The description of the transformation of the LJRB
given in the preceding section can now be
paralleled by a more quantitative accounting of
the resulting (im)balance between supply and
demand. The water-accounting exercise presented
here draws on the categories of water balance
proposed by Molden (1997) and summarized in
appendix 2. The net inflow includes rainfall, basin
transfers into the basin, and possible net
overdraft of the aquifer and reservoirs. This total
inflow is partly transformed through
evapotranspiration of crops (irrigated, rain-fed and
also natural vegetation) and water bodies, and
through municipal and industrial (M&I) processes.
The balance flows outside the basin (surface or
underground flows): one fraction is committed to
downstream use and the remaining uncommitted
part is considered usable (if it can be put to use
through better management of existing facilities)
or not usable (e.g., uncontrollable flood flows).
These definitions are somewhat problematic
when applied to the Jordan basin. If we consider
the environmental flow needed to maintain the
level of the Dead Sea as a “commitment,” then
the basin has been having a deficit of around 540
Mm3/yr since the early fifties (figure 11), at the
time Israel diverted the Upper Jordan river and
reduced it to a trickle of water. The remaining
flow to the Dead Sea is mostly limited to the
Yarmouk and side-wadis, resulting in a gradual
and constant drop in the water level of the Dead
Sea (figure 11). On such a basis, if we consider
this environmental flow as one use among others
the basin accounting points to an extreme
overcommitment, with 540 Mm3/yr adding to a net
overdraft of approximately 32 Mm3/yr to make up
a shortfall greater than all the water used by
irrigated crops in the basin. Although this does
correspond to reality, considering such a shortfall
would distort our water balances to the point of
making them meaningless. We have chosen here
to consider that there is no commitment of the
waters entering the Dead Sea, which is, therefore,
considered as a sink. Any freshwater or brackish
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water flowing into it is, therefore, considered as
uncommitted nonusable water.40
In such conditions, the meaning of “available
water” tends to lose its significance because it is
equal to the water depleted, i.e., to the renewable
water minus the flow to the Dead Sea. We have,
therefore, chosen to use two more meaningful
variables: “renewable blue water” is the sum of
surface water, aquifer recharge, and imports from
both groundwater (distant aquifers) and surface
water (desalinated water from the Red Sea).
“Controlled renewable blue water” is the
“renewable blue water” from which the part of
the Yarmouk water that flows undiverted to the
Jordan river is deducted, as well as brackish
flows from Israel to the river, both resources
which are of no use and cannot be controlled
(and, therefore, may or may not be
disregarded).
Molden (1997) defines water depletion as a
use or removal of water from a water basin that
renders it unavailable for further use (the depleted
fraction being the share of the water which is
depleted, often expressed in percentage of the
net or gross inflow). Water depletion is a key
concept for water accounting, as interest is
focused mostly on the productivity and the derived
benefits per unit of water depleted. It is extremely
important to distinguish water depletion from water
diverted to a service or use, as not all water
diverted to a use is depleted. Water is depleted by
four generic processes (Molden 1997):
• Evaporation: Water is vaporized from
surfaces or transpired by plants (rain-fed
or irrigated).
• Flows to sinks: Water flows into a sea,
saline groundwater, or other location
where it is not readily or economically
recovered for reuse.
40Alternatively, one may consider this remaining outflow to be committed to environmental preservation: this does not change the
calculation of the available water within the basin since we consider there is no uncommitted-usable water. Water reaching the Jordan
river is of too low quality to be used.
41Land-use raw data are drawn from the Water Sector Planning Support Project (WSPSP, MWI/GTZ). It is the result of a GIS-analysis
of two LandSat images dated August 1999 and May 2000, respectively.
• Pollution: Water quality gets degraded to
an extent that it is unfit for certain uses.
• Incorporation into a product: Through an
industrial or agricultural process, such as
bottling water or incorporation of water
into plant tissues.
The water accounting of the basin for the
year 2000 is based on the data appearing in
figure 9 and land-use data combining remote
sensing data (HKJ/MWI/GTZ 2004)41 and official
statistics. Flow data for years 1950 and 1975 are
those appearing in the flow charts presented
earlier. For these two periods, land-use patterns
have been interpolated from the 2000 data,
using figures for the total cultivated area and
historical descriptions of land use (notably
Baker and Harza 1955; THKJ 1977; Khouri
1981; Elmusa 1994).
We first give a detailed accounting of the
water flows in 2000 (current situation) and then
observe historical changes in land use and in the
components of the water balance.
Water Accounting in 2000
Figure 12 first provides the depleted fraction
(expressed in percentage of the net inflow) for
each subbasin (see subbasins map in appendix 3
and the diagram of subbasins in appendix 4). We
can see that, in the Jordan valley (hydrological
subbasin) only half of the net inflow is depleted.
This is due to the high amount of uncontrolled
water since, at the moment, out of the 200 Mm3/
yr “imported” from the upper Yarmouk basin, only
90 Mm3/yr can be controlled and diverted to the
KAC, the remaining 110 Mm3/yr flowing
uncontrolled to the Dead Sea.
33
FIGURE 11.
Historical evolution of the annual water inflow and level of the Dead Sea.
Source: "upper" panel from Arab Potash Company (personal communication) and "lower" panel from Harza (1998).
On the other hand, very little water flows out
of the other subbasins and part of this water
(especially in the Amman-Zarqa basin) is made
up of return flows from cities.
Overall, the Lower Jordan basin consumes 86
percent of its net inflow (i.e., rainfall, interbasin
transfers and lateral groundwater flows) through
evaporation and processes. We can further
distinguish as follows:
• Beneficial depletion refers to
evapotranspiration from both irrigation and
rain-fed agriculture as well as M&I uses.
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42The depleted fraction in M&I uses is taken as 30 percent. This is higher than values corresponding to industrial and human consumption
but includes the depleted fraction of outdoor uses such as city gardens, car wash, etc.
• Low-beneficial depletion refers to
evaporation from natural vegetation and
forest.
• Non-beneficial depletion refers to
evaporation from bare land, deserts, and
water bodies.
In the LJRB the beneficial depleted fraction
accounts for 22 percent of the net inflow, the low
beneficial depleted fraction for 6 percent, and the
non-beneficial depleted fraction for the remaining
59 percent.
Figure 13 shows these three categories
(beneficial, low-beneficial and non-beneficial
fractions) in more detail and in relative terms
(% of the total depleted fraction). It illustrates that
beneficial depletion (corresponding to the sum of
the four “‘process” fractions) is higher in the
valley where it reaches approximately 76 percent
of the total depleted fraction, and lower in the
Zarqa basin where it only represents 31 percent
of the total depleted fraction, while the
non-beneficial evaporation/use (bare land and
water bodies) is highest because of its large
desert area. The low-beneficial depleted fraction
corresponds to forests and grasslands mostly
grazed by sheep and is highest in the mountain
area (north and south-wadis basins).
With the exception of the valley, where it
amounts to 63 percent of the total depleted
fraction (cf., figure 13), the share of the irrigation
process (crop ET, irrigated), which stands for
water depletion in irrigated agriculture, remains
limited (7, 7, 9 and 14%, respectively, of the total
depleted fraction in the north wadis, south wadis,
Yarmouk and Amman-Zarqa basins). On the
entire Lower Jordan river basin, irrigation process
accounts for 18 percent of the total depleted
fraction.
Finally, over 40 percent of the rainfall which
is depleted in the basin is lost with no benefit
whatsoever (mainly through evaporation of bare
land).
The figure also shows that despite all the
allocation conflicts between the cities and
agriculture, the share of M&I uses42 (process
drinking and process industry on figure 13) is
negligible, representing only 3 percent of the total
depleted fraction in the LJRB, but rises to 14
percent when compared with irrigation depletion.
The importance of irrigation is better
demonstrated by figure 14. The depleted fraction
in irrigated agriculture makes up 45 percent of the
“beneficial” depleted fraction, on the entire LJRB
that is, irrigation almost equates rain-fed
agriculture although irrigated areas are three times
smaller than rain-fed ones (cf., figure 15).
Irrigation depletion is particularly high in the
Jordan valley subbasin where it reaches 84
percent of the beneficial depleted fraction.
In terms of fraction of the net inflow, however,
the share of the irrigation fraction drops down to
15 percent basin-wide (but remains very high in
the valley at 28%), due to the significance of the
low-beneficial and non-beneficial depletion.
Evolution of the Terms of the Water
Balance in the LJRB
From a situation in the 1950s when few of the
surface water and groundwater resources were
put into use, to the current situation of
overexploitation, the terms of the water balance
have presumably varied from one extreme to the
other and the examination of these changes is
likely to be very instructive.
Changes in Land Use
The first notable evolution is that of land use.
Irrigated areas increased from around 10,200
hectares in 1950 to 24,900 hectares in 1975,
and to 45,800 hectares at present (cf., figure
15), including both schemes in the valley and
groundwater-based agriculture in the highlands.
This total area is projected to decrease by
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FIGURE 13.
Categories of depleted fractions (Lower Jordan basin and subbasins, base year 2000).
FIGURE 12.
Percentage of the net inflow depleted (i.e., depleted fraction) on the Lower Jordan basin and subbasins, base year
2000).
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FIGURE 14.
Water depleted in irrigation (irrigation fraction) in each subbasin, as percentage of beneficial depletion and net inflow.
about 10 percent in the next quarter century
and to reach about 41,400 hectares: a
relatively limited decline due to a decrease of
irrigated agriculture in the highlands, partly
counterbalanced by an increase in the Jordan
valley.
Rain-fed cropping areas have significantly
increased in the 1950–1975 period (from 108,000
FIGURE 15.
Evolution of vegetated areas in the LJRB in Jordan.
Natural vegetation (ha) 145,398 118,847 114,182 122,864
Rain-fed crops area (ha) 271,209 334,924 260,577 269,259
Irrigated area (ha) 10,250 24,902 45,812 37,389
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to 165,000 ha), with cereals providing work and
food to a growing population. This extensive type
of agriculture later declined, with a shift in the
economy towards nonagricultural activities. The
natural vegetation (forests and grasslands)
contracted and expanded in line with these
changes. It decreased from 155,000 hectares to
109,000 hectares between 1950 and 1975
because of the large expansion of rain-fed
agriculture, and later increased by about 5,000
hectares, and is expected to further increase (to
about 123,000 ha), following a decrease in the
irrigated area in the highlands.
Figure 16 shows the evolution of the cropped
area between 1950 and 2025 and differentiates
between the Jordan valley and the highlands
(defined as the sum of the four subbasins that
are the north wadis, the south wadis, the
Yarmouk and the Amman-Zarqa basins).
The figure highlights the structural differences
existing between the Jordan valley and the
highlands. Cropped areas are much larger in the
highlands (total area of 143,900 ha) than in the
Jordan valley (total of 32,300 ha) which reflects
the large areas of rain-fed cereals and olive trees
planted in the highlands (total of 121,100 ha).
In the valley, irrigated crops have always
constituted a large share of the total cropped
area. From 1950s onward, irrigated areas have
continuously increased from 9,300 hectares in
1950 (31% of the total cropped area) to 16,100
hectares in 1975 (56% of the total cropped area),
and to 22,970 hectares at present (71% of the
total cropped area), with projections for the year
2025 at 27,300 hectares (75% of the total
cropped area). At the same time, rain-fed areas
(limited to cereals) have continuously decreased
(21,000, 12,700 and 9,300 ha in 1950, 1975 and
2000, respectively). This last figure is projected
to remain unchanged by the year 2025.
In the highlands, rain-fed areas (both cereals
and olive trees) are predominant and mainly
located near the side-wadi basins. We can see
from figure 16 that areas with cereals strongly
increased between 1950 and 1975 and then
decreased during the last 25 years, while rain-fed
olive trees (mainly located in the north side-wadis
and south-side wadi basin as well as along the
wadi Zarqa) increased significantly between 1975
and 2000 (from 16,900 to 49,300 ha).
Irrigated areas are now comparable to those
in the valley (22,800 ha in 2000) but their
expansion occurred in the early 1980s, much later
than in the valley. Moreover, they only represent
now 16 percent of the total cropped area (against
1% and 5.5% in 1950 and 1975, respectively). In
our projections we considered that irrigated areas
in the highlands will decrease by 38 percent
within the next 20 years, both in absolute (to
14,200 ha) and in relative terms (to 10.5%), while
rain-fed areas will remain stable at about 121,100
hectares.
Figure 16 clearly shows the importance of
irrigated orchards in the highlands and their
dramatic increase: irrigated olive trees increased
from 420 hectares in 1950 to 3,900 hectares in
1975, and it has reached about 11,000 hectares
as at present, i.e., almost half of the irrigated
areas in the highlands (the other half consists of
vegetables and stone fruit trees), of which 8,170
hectares are located in the midst of the desert
(Venot 2004b).
Evolution of the Water Balance in the
LJRB
The net inflow into the basin moved from over
3,300 Mm3/yr in 1950 to around 2,600 Mm3/yr in
the following periods, because of the diversion of
the Jordan river by Israel and growing abstraction
of the water of the Yarmouk river by Syria.43
Deducting rainfall water directly evaporated from
crops and bare soil, Figure 17 focuses on the
renewable blue water and shows a similar drop by
50 percent, with a slump at 671 Mm3 in 2000 and
a subsequent increase by 23 percent projected
for 2025, because of water imports. The
43The net inflow appears stable between 2000 and 2025: The increase in imported water is compensated by less groundwater use
and losses in the Wehdah dam.
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FIGURE 17.
Evolution of net inflow and available water in the Jordanian part of the LJRB.
FIGURE 16.
Crop- and region-wise evolution of cropped area in the LJRB.
controlled renewable blue water (CRBW) is
significantly lower, since uncontrolled and/or
brackish flows from the Yarmouk or Israel are
discounted. The expected increase in 2025
mirrors the imports and the larger share of the
Yarmouk diverted by the Wehdah dam. Strikingly,
withdrawals (gross diversions of surface water
plus abstracted groundwater) now amount to 127
percent of CRBW (i.e., 660 Mm3/yr) because of
groundwater overabstraction and multiple
diversions (return flows from wadi-irrigation or
from Amman are reused downstream).
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44It has been hypothesized that the Mukheibeh wells, located in the Yarmouk basin and used to supply the KAC with some 20 Mm3/yr
of additional freshwater (it is expected that this water will be used for drinking purposes in 2025), abstract water from the Yarmouk
aquifer. Following Salameh (1990) and Salameh and Bannayan (1993), we have computed a groundwater flow of 25 Mm3/yr from the
Yarmouk aquifer to the north side-wadi basin. As a result, the balance of the Yarmouk aquifer shows a substantial overdraft (-13 Mm3/
yr) while, on the contrary, the aquifers of the side-wadis show a yearly net gain of 22 Mm3/yr (in the north side-wadis).
Note: All data refer to the situation circa 2000. Figures for inflows, outflows and different indicators of water depletion are given in
Mm3/yr; fractions are given as percentages. Data are based on the chart presented in figure 19 and are drawn from a comprehensive
list of figures presented in appendix 6. All numbers have been rounded.
Most of the numbers given for subbasins are summed up to obtain the figure corresponding to the entire LJRB. However, transfers
between subbasins do not add up at the basin level because some of the transfers are internal to the basin. Water is moved from
one reservoir to another without affecting the global water balance of the basin.
Withdrawals have continuously and dramatically
increased in the last 50 years: they were at 101
Mm3/yr in 1950 (20 percent of the CRBW), at 314
Mm3/yr in 1975 (58 percent of the CRBW), and at
660 Mm3/yr in 2000. They are expected to reach
970 Mm3/yr in 2025. In 2000, only 315 Mm3/yr
ends into the Dead Sea and this amount
decreases to 165 Mm3/yr if we do not consider
the (still uncontrolled) flow from the Yarmouk and
from Israel to the Jordan valley.
The figure also shows the evolution of the
process beneficial depleted fraction (in irrigated
and rain-fed agriculture, and in M&I), which
almost equates CRBW in 2000 (effective rainfall
and aquifer overdraft are coincidently close to the
nonconsumed part of CRBW) and levels off in
2025 (increase in M&I compensated by a
decrease in highland irrigation).
Aquifers began to be overexploited during the
last quarter of the century (the groundwater
budget still presented a positive balance of 51
Mm3/yr in 1975), the situation being now worrying
since the overdraft reaches 32 Mm3/yr. A net
positive balance of 83 Mm3/yr on the entire LJRB
in Jordan is expected to be reached during the
next quarter of the century (with the assumption
of 30% decrease in highland agriculture, and an
increase in the return flows associated with the
use of water imported from other basins [including
the Red-Dead project]).
The evolution of the depleted fraction,
distributed over three categories (process/
beneficial, low-beneficial, and non-beneficial
depletion), is given in figure 17. It can be seen
that the biggest change occurred in the 1950–
1975 period, when the total beneficial depletion
increased dramatically from 391 to 756 Mm3/yr (or
from 21% to 37% of the total depleted fraction).
This happened when cropped areas increased and
when the net inflow was curtailed by the diversion
of the Upper Jordan river by Israel. This trend
continued in the last quarter of the century and
took the beneficial depleted fraction to 39 percent
of total depletion (867 Mm3/yr) (partly due to the
overexploitation of aquifers). At the same time,
the depleted fraction (expressed in percentage of
the net inflow) increased from 58 percent to 86
percent and will continue to increase up to 92
percent in the next 25 years.
Figure 18 also illustrates that the non-
beneficial depleted fraction stayed (and will
remain) roughly constant since 1950, while its
relative share continuously decreased because of
the expansion of the cropped area (both rain-fed
and irrigated) contributing to the beneficial
depleted fraction.
Figure 19 zeroes in on the irrigation fraction,
i.e., the percentage of water depleted in irrigated
agriculture as a percentage of the total beneficial
depletion and of the net inflow. It indicates a quite
dramatic increase from 2 percent of the net inflow
in 1950 to around 18 percent at present (making
up 45% of the beneficial depleted fraction). Again,
these figures are expected to decline, under the
assumption that highland irrigated agriculture is to
be reduced and that more water is imported for
cities. It is interesting to note that the shares of
both the valley and the highlands in the irrigation
depletion fraction are almost identical (not
shown). This is due to comparable irrigated areas
in these two regions of the basin.
Table 1 provides details of all the terms of
the water accounting for the whole LJRB as well
as for its five subbasins.44 Appendix 3 also
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FIGURE 18.
Evolution of depleted fractions in the LJRB (nominal values and percentage).
FIGURE 19.
Changes in the fraction of water depleted in irrigation (irrigation fraction) expressed as a percentage of beneficial
depletion and available water.
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provides a flow chart for each of the subbasins,
indicating the rainfall, ET fraction, groundwater
net balance, imports and exports for the year
2000, while appendix 6 shows the terms of the
water balance for each subbasin.
Note on Water Use Efficiency
These basin-level figures prompt some reflections
on the question of efficiency in water use.
Groundwater-based irrigation efficiency in the
41
Jordan Valley North- South- Yarmouk Amman-Zarqa LowerJordan
Basin Wadis Wadis  Basin  Basin  Basin
Inflow Direct rainfall 190 460 253 530 801 2,235
Import/inflow from other basins 477 17 0 9 75 310
Lateral groundwater flows 0 25 0 0 28 28
Gross inflow 667 502 253 539 904 2,573
Storage change Reservoirs 0 0 0 0 0 0
Soil (groundwater depletion) 0 22 –0.1 –12.5 –41 –32
Net inflow 667 481 254 552 944 2,605
Depletion Beneficial Irrigation Process (crop ET, irrigated) 188 29 15 42 117 391
Rain-fed crop Process (crop ET, rain-fed) 32 170 50 114 46 413
Process (industry) 0 0 0 0.2 2 2
Process (drinking) 3 11 2 5 40 61
Non-beneficial evaporation (reservoirs) 1 2 0.2 0 2 5
Non-beneficial evaporation (bare land) 69 74 93 185 557 978
Low-beneficial (evap., from nat.veg+forest) 6 147 70 108 53 385
Total depleted 299 434 231 455 816 2,235
Outflow Committed water 0 17 18 52 13 0
Non-committed water (usable) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Non-committed water (nonusable) 318 30 5 0 35 318
Export to other basins 50 0 0 45 80 52
Total outflow 368 47 23 97 128 370
Renewable blue water (RBW)  705
Controlled renewable blue water (CRBW)  545
Aquifer net overdraft 0 22 0 –13 –41 –32
Indicators Depleted fraction percentage of net inflow 45 90 91 82 86 86
Process fraction percentage of net inflow 33 44 27 29 22 33
Process fraction percentage of depleted water 74 48 29 36 25 39
Low-beneficial depletion (non-process) percentage of net inflow 1 31 28 20 6 15
Low-beneficial depletion (non-process) percentage of depleted water 2 34 30 24 7 17
Non-beneficial depletion (non-process) percentage of net inflow 11 16 37 33 59 38
Non-beneficial depletion (non-process) percentage of depleted water 23 18 40 41 68 44
Irrigation Process (crop ET irrigated) percentage of beneficial depletion 84 14 23 26 57 45
Irrigation Process (crop ET irrigated) percentage of depleted water 63 7 7 9 14 18
Irrigation Process (crop ET irrigated) percentage of net inflow 28 6 6 8 12 15
TABLE 1.
Details of water accounting for the Jordan river basin and each subbasin.
Note: Unit of measure is Million m3
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highlands has increased in the last two decades,
with an almost complete shift from surface water
irrigation to micro-irrigation (Elmusa 1994; THKJ
2004). This, in many cases, has allowed the
discharge obtained from each well to be “spread”
over a larger area (Venot 2004c), bringing more
benefit to the farmer but resulting also in more
evapotranspiration and less return flow to the
aquifer, thus compounding the net overdraft. As
mentioned earlier, there is evidence that
percolation losses from irrigation in the highlands
return to the aquifer and are, therefore, not
significant in terms of net water balance or
savings. (Secondary benefits from improved
efficiency come from reduced pumping costs.)
Areas irrigated by diversion of wadis along the
main valleys also have high efficiencies because
return flows are quickly reintegrated to the main
stream.
In the valley, the shift to micro-irrigation owes
more to the intensification of agriculture than to
water scarcity per se since it started 20 years
before talks of a water crisis emerged. Cultivation
of vegetables under plastic mulch that controls
weeds competing with vegetables makes micro-
irrigation necessary and also allows better
application of water and “fertigation.” Other more
extensive crops (notably citrus) as well as part of
the banana crop are still irrigated by gravity but
the defined JVA-quotas45 keep application losses
to a minimum since quotas are less than full crop
requirements. In the long term, adoption of micro-
irrigation in the valley is beneficial because it
allows a reduction of allotments and because the
return flow is little used: surface runoff quickly
flows to the Jordan river, where it mixes with
brackish water and is not diverted further
downstream; part of the percolation losses is
drained by the Jordan river and the main part
replenishes the Jordan valley aquifer but the use
of this aquifer is limited since only the upper part
of this aquifer is not too brackish and can be
used for non-salt-sensitive crops (also note cases
of desalination for banana cultivation in the
southern part of the valley). Therefore, gains in
efficiency are desirable when they limit runoff to
the Jordan river, but with a possible impact on
downstream groundwater users.
However, water use efficiency at the plot
level is already rather high (it is generally taken
at 80% for drip irrigation; see THKJ 2004) and
possible on-farm savings are, therefore, limited.
More significant gains will be realized at the basin
level when the Wehdah dam will allow managers
to control water in the Yarmouk and distribute it
throughout the year according to real
requirements. Even this benefit is partly unclear
because the current benefits of excess water
availability in KAC (in months when flows in the
Yarmouk are abundant) in terms of salt lixiviation
are not well known and might be understated
(McCornick et al. 2001).
Appendix 7 provides additional water
accounting indicators which allow us to evaluate
the overall efficiency of water use in the basin,
considered as a system. This efficiency has
continuously increased since the depleted fraction
expressed both in percentage of RBW (3% in
1950; 24% in 1975; 67% in 2000) or in
percentage of the CRBW (11% in 1950; 37% in
1975; and 87% in 2000) has sharply increased.
These efficiencies are expected to further
increase to 82 percent and 87 percent,
respectively, by 2025 (figure 20).
This underlines the fact that the LJRB is a
closed river basin, where almost no water
resource is left to be mobilized and used. It is
noteworthy that the process of closure has been
very rapid since the development of the basin
dates back only to the early 1950s and is fast
approaching completion. With the caveat
regarding our earlier assumption on environmental
flows, the basin efficiency stands around 90
percent at present.
455,110 m3/ha/year for vegetables, 9,990 m3/ha/year for citrus, and 13,200 m3/ha/year for bananas (according to the new rules of the
JVA Water Resources Department [see Venot 2004]) to which must be added some extra amounts from private water sources (wells),
community water sources (wadis), and exceptional supply requested from the JVA. However, these quotas are defined in terms of mm/
day and are both constraining in some months and not fully used in others (Petitguyot 2003).
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In other words, there are very few prospects
to alleviate the Jordanian water crisis by technical
improvement aiming at increasing water use
efficiency since overall, at the basin scale, this
efficiency (volume of depleted water expressed in
percentage of the volume of water withdrawals)
already reaches 72 percent. This does not mean
that saving water through improved fine-tuning of
irrigation supply in the valley or through water-
saving technology does not need to be
considered, but it does set a drastic limit to what
can be achieved through conservation means.
Refining Water-Use Categories
A limitation of the water accounting is that the
water use (withdrawals) category pools together
four different kind of water sources that are
groundwater, surface water (controlled by dams),
stream water (uncontrolled flows that are
diverted), and efficient rainfall (used by irrigated
and rain-fed crops)—(Molle 2003). These
categories of water are not equivalent because
the degree of control we have on these four
resources varies highly (in decreasing order in the
above list).
It is, therefore, instructive to disaggregate
water use into these four categories and to plot
these fractions against time. By so doing, we
obtain a view of both their relative importance
and time dynamics, as illustrated in figure 21.
Figure 21 first shows that rainfall on rain-fed
crops constitutes the major category of beneficial
water, even in such arid conditions.46 It is due to
the large extent of rain-fed crops within the basin
(cf., figure 15). It is also striking that groundwater
use (gross abstraction) in the LJRB now appears
as a source of greater magnitude than (controlled)
gross diversions of surface water (275 Mm3/yr
against 120 Mm3/yr in 2000), although this will be
reversed when the Red-Dead project is in
operation.
Surface water follows the construction of the
dams, while stream water includes side-wadis and
Yarmouk diversions: this term increased with the
construction of the KAC (supplied by water
diverted from the Yarmouk) but decreases as
dam construction shifts water from the stream
water category to the surface water category.
FIGURE 20.
Basin management efficiency.
46While all other three quadrants show gross withdrawal values, the rainfall quadrant shows the fraction used by the plants only. If we
consider total direct rainfall the difference would be even more considerable (for example, 912 Mm3 in 2000).
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FIGURE 21.
Four-quadrant diagram presenting water withdrawal trends in the LJRB from 1950 to 2025 according to several water
“categories.”
The total natural recharge of the aquifers (158
Mm3/yr for the LJRB, as evaluated by THKJ
[2004]) is indicated in the “groundwater quadrant.”
The notion of safe yield as the level of
abstraction that does not impact on existing
users or ecological sustainability is very fuzzy. In
general, water pumped from the aquifer incurs
both a “de-stockage” of the aquifer itself and a
reduction in the base-flow and spring discharge.
Current hydrogeological knowledge does not allow
us to establish an accurate balance of all these
flows, all the more because both recharge and
abstraction fluctuate in time. While abstraction is
often compared to natural recharge (or some
value of safe yield), recharge by return flows of
urban and agricultural uses is often not
considered despite their magnitude.
The total return flow through percolation of
groundwater use in the LJRB is currently
estimated at 89 Mm3/yr47 against 153 Mm3/yr48 for
the natural recharge (calculated as direct recharge
by rainfall plus possible lateral flow minus base-
flow) and will reach 168 Mm3/yr in 2025 compared
with a total expected abstraction of 237 Mm3/yr
pointing to the fact that it is imperative to take
such flows into account, although more
47This figure is an evaluation of the authors assuming that agricultural irrigation efficiency is about 80 percent (figure largely used in
the literature: Al-Weshah 2000; ARD 2001; THKJ 2004), and that the efficiency of urban water supply reaches 70 percent (Abu-
Shams 2003; Decker 2004) and will increase to 80 percent by the year 2025.
48It is worth noting that the annual recharge considered here is lower than the one presented in the THKJ 2004 by about 39 Mm3/yr.
Estimates of overabstraction will therefore be higher than in THKJ 2004.
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information on their dynamics is needed.49 Not
taking into account such return flows leads to
evaluating of current abstraction at 180 percent,
against 119 percent in the opposite case. The
difference is even sharper for the projections
for the year 2025 when expected net
abstraction will only represent 45 percent of
the overall groundwater recharge, but 155
percent if we disregard return flows
(cf., appendix 8).
This shows how numbers can vary depending
on the hypotheses made and how they may
support very contrasting conclusions and lead to
different policies. We underline here that the
increase in water use allowed by interbasin
transfers of freshwater and pumping from the
KAC could, by the way of their return flows,
counterbalance the present overabstraction of the
aquifers, at least locally.50 The impact of water
imports on groundwater recharge is crucial but
often overlooked. This conclusion must, however,
be considered very carefully: more studies on the
characteristics of both the aquifers and return
flows from different uses are needed to develop
an accurate groundwater budget and to refine
quantitative assessments. It must also be
emphasized that the figures on net abstraction
highly depend on the evaluation of the annual
recharge.
It is useful to emphasize that the four
categories distinguished in figure 21 are not, and
cannot be, “waterproof,” in the sense that some
pumped groundwater, for example, can return to the
aquifer, make its way to the river as base-flow, be
stored and/or diverted again to other uses. The
interconnectedness of the hydrological regime and
the reuse of some fraction of water flows make it
impossible to disaggregate water flows and stocks
into fully independent categories.
The concomitant decrease of inflow (due to
upstream diversions by Israel and Syria), later
partly compensated for by imports from other
FIGURE 22.
Evolution of sectoral water use (nominal values and percentage).
49Return flow from cities (leakage, percolation from outdoor uses and sewers, etc.) and agriculture (now reduced because of the
generalization of micro-irrigation) are not well known. It is possible that some fraction is taken up by evapotranspiration (capillarity and
phreatophytes) but studies on water quality identifying a high level of nitrates near agricultural wells (JICA 2001) point to a significant
return flow to the aquifer. The time lag for the transfer from the surface to the aquifer is also not well known.
50A limitation of our approach is that water budgets are done at the subbasin level. High groundwater return flows in the Amman
region may not replenish the aquifer uniformly. Moreover, there is also a question of water quality, since return flows replenishing
aquifers will be of lower quality.
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basins, and increase in total withdrawals have
reduced the nondiverted fraction of “stream water”
to almost nil: from 1,335 Mm3/yr in 1950 to 489
Mm3/yr in 1975 and to 252 Mm3/yr at present; the
projected value for 2025 is 163 Mm3/yr. This is
once again, an illustration of the rapid closure of
the Jordan river basin in the last 50 years. Very
little water remains unmobilized and the basin can
hardly be developed further without interbasin
transfers that will play a major role in the future.
Sectoral Water Use
We may also investigate the evolution of sectoral
water use over the last 50 years. Figure 22
provides a striking representation of how
agricultural withdrawals (gross river diversions
plus groundwater abstraction) have leveled off
since the mid-1970s. In contrast, M&I withdrawals
reached 31 percent in 2000 and are expected to
go up to 52 percent in 2025. This evolution will
reproduce something similar to that what is
observed in Israel, where agricultural water use
remains, by and large, stable but increasingly
relies on treated wastewater, while M&I uses
benefit from increases in supply and eventually
supersede agriculture. The share of groundwater
in M&I is dominant but this situation will also be
inverted with the supply of the Red-Dead project.
Table 2 indicates how these withdrawals
relate to population change, with the annual
growth between 2000 and 2025 being computed
at 2.8 percent per year. With industrial
withdrawals estimated at 37 and 80 Mm3 in 2000
and 2025, respectively, for the entire Jordan,
municipal per capita daily endowments were at
127 l/capita/day in 200051 and will rise up to 184
l/capita/day in 2025, due to an increase in supply
through imported water. These values are slightly
higher than those considered in the 2004 Master
Plan (THKJ 2004). Low values for 1950 and 1975
indicate the higher weight of rural areas and
perhaps improper knowledge and computing of
M&I diversions at the time.
TABLE 2.
Evolution of per-capita withdrawals in the LJRB.
Year 1950 1975 2000 2025
Population (1,000) 498 1,539 4,283 7,261
Irrigation withdrawals (Mm3/yr) 90 275 445 485
M&I withdrawals (Mm3/yr) 10.5 41 205 507
Per capita total withdrawals (m3/yr) 202 205 152 137
Per capita M&I withdrawals (m3/yr) 21 27 48 70
Per capita M&I withdrawals (l/c/day) 58 73 131 191
Per capita municipal withdrawals (l/c/day) 127 184
51This value corresponds to the whole Lower Jordan basin and is lower than the average for Amman   (115 l/capita/day).
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Conclusion
This report illustrates the gradual
“anthropogenization” and “complexification” of a
river basin over a time span of 50 years. It
describes a quite striking transformation from a
situation around 1950, when only 10,000 hectares
were irrigated, groundwater was untapped and
abundant water flowed to the Dead Sea, to the
current situation when nearly all surface
resources are tapped and committed and
groundwater is being severely overexploited. Both
the valley and the highlands, on the one hand,
and agriculture and cities, on the other, are
interconnected and interdependent. This
interdependence manifests itself in terms of water
quantity and also more and more in terms of
water quality. For example, freshwater is pumped
in the highlands and from distant aquifers to
supply the city of Amman, which depletes some
fraction but returns the bulk of it as wastewater,
although of reduced quality. This wastewater is
treated and sent to the irrigation schemes in the
valley; drainage water has a higher salt content
and eventually reaches the Dead Sea. This path,
from highland aquifers to the Dead Sea illustrates
the growing difficulties in terms of sustainability,
water quality and allocation.
The quantitative analysis of historical
evolutions has shown that most of the water
accounting indices varied sharply between 1950
and 1975, on account of both a growth in rain-fed
and irrigated agriculture, and the quasi interruption
of the flows coming from the upper Jordan. In the
following 25 years, water use became
unsustainable because of an overdraft of the
aquifers (and concomitant reduction of the flow in
the Yarmouk, diverted upstream by Syria). At
present, circa 2000, while around 2,600 Mm3/yr of
surface water and rainfall water enter the basin on
average, only 317 Mm3/yr reach the Dead Sea.
The balance is depleted, 18 percent of it in
irrigated fields, 18 percent in rain-fed areas, and 3
percent in M&I uses, while the rest is evaporated
by natural vegetation and bare lands. However, if
we restrict ourselves to the renewable blue water
(i.e., surface runoff and groundwater annual
recharge), 67 percent of this volume appears to
be depleted through beneficial use and this
percentage springs up to 87 percent if we
disregard the uncontrolled flow of the Yarmouk to
the Jordan valley. This clearly illustrates the
continuing process of water mobilization and
consumption registered in the Jordan river basin
during the last 50 years. At present the basin is
closed, as almost all the water is mobilized and
depleted. Because of the reuse of water and of
current groundwater overdraft, withdrawals amount
to 127 percent of controllable blue water.
It is also important to note that these high
percentages of controlled and depleted volumes
are obtained although we made the drastic
assumption that flows to the Dead Sea were
uncommitted (and non-usable). By considering the
Dead Sea as a sink we have ignored the massive
environmental and economic costs resulting from
the continuous drawdown of its water level. The
justifications in terms of culture, religion or
tourism industry conjured up to justify the
investment in the Red-Dead project, and give a
measure of what these costs might be. It is thus
necessary to recall that the closure of the Jordan
basin is described here in a context where
environmental considerations have de facto be
written off as a result of the diversion of the
upper Jordan by Israel.
Shifting patterns of water use have also
reflected changes in the wider economy.
Extensive rain-fed agriculture in the highlands
increased before the mid-1970s as a necessity to
provide food and work to a population swollen by
the migration of refugees, but later declined with
the change in the economy and the growth of
cities. The most intensive part of the agriculture
sector developed mainly during the 1970s and
1980s (cultivation of vegetables and fruits, first in
the valley and then in the highlands, mostly for
export). It is now affected by the increasing use
of wastewater but above all by changes in
relative competitiveness with regard to other
regional producers, by changes in market prices,
and by wider regional geo-politics: population
growth is also linked to the wider political
situation in the Middle East and strongly
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influences pressure on water resources. It is
likely, however, that this intensive agriculture will
remain stable, even if it sees its water supply
reduced in quantity and quality.
The study has identified two “anomalies” in
the agricultural sector. Citrus orchards in the
valley and olive trees in the highlands are
conspicuous by their low profitability and water
productivity. They fit the strategies of urban
absentee owners who are interested by the social
prestige or the culturally positive image attached
to agriculture (and by shady gardens in the
countryside to spend their weekends) rather than
by direct profit (Lavergne 1996). Both these crops
consume high-quality water which could be used
for cities. The irrigated area in the highland is
now controlled but its reduction remains an
important policy objective, since local aquifers are
critically overexploited. Banana cultivation in the
valley owes its record profitability to custom
duties on imports rather than to its intrinsic value,
and it also incurs an economic cost to society.
These anomalies notwithstanding, it must be
acknowledged that the Wehdah dam will bring
controlled blue water resources at the level of 94
percent of the total blue water, that irrigation
efficiency has now been drastically improved
through micro-irrigation, that percolation losses in
highland agriculture largely return to the aquifer,
and that consequently the scope for water
savings both at the local and basin levels is
much reduced. Although control of leakage in the
Amman water supply network and further
efficiency gains in the valley are desirable, they
will not radically alter the fact that a ceiling has
been reached and that demand-management
options may only alleviate the actual situation
without providing long-term solutions. That
prevailing mid- and long-term solutions are
eventually typical capital- and technology-
intensive supply augmentation projects, namely
large-scale interbasin transfers and desalination,
may therefore not be only the sign of a lasting
dominance of the engineering approach. This may
also partly explain why calls for demand
management have been only partially incorporated
or implemented, the opposition from vested
interest groups only contributes in raising the
political costs of policy options that provide only
limited potential. The reallocation of water to the
M&I sector (ultimately, the valley is expected to
mostly receive and use treated wastewater) and
the subsequent reopening of the basin through
water transfers and desalination is also observed
in Israel and might signal a wider evolution of arid
countries.
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Appendix 1
Sources of Water Accounting
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Shemas Data Issue Data Source
Figure * indicates figures chosen in our charts and round off to 5 Mm3/year
Hydrology Surface Waters   
Upper Jordan flow into lake Tiberius 840 Goffen and Gal. 1992.
 900 Soffer. 1994a.
 870 Klein, M. 1998.
 890* Internet: http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/80858e/
80858E06.htm
 Evaporation in lake Tiberius 283* Klein, M. 1998.
 210 GTZ. 1998.
 270 Internet: http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/80858e/
80858E06.htm
 Natural outflow of lake Tiberius 605* El-Nasser, H. 1988.; Salameh, E.; Bannayan, H. 1993.
 590 Klein, M. 1998.
 600 Beaumont, P. 1997.
 Yarmouk river natural average flow (all tributaries) 455 Al-Jayyousi, O. 2001.
Variability of the evaluations we are presenting for the
Yarmouk river flow are mainly linked to the period during 438 Khori, R. 1981.
when the measurements have been done. We can 480 Hof, F. C. 1998.
observe the figure of 470 Mm3/year has the highest 300 Qaisi, K. 2001.
frequency and we choose it as the historical flow of the 475 Klein, M. 1998.
Yarmouk river before any water development projects. 170-440 Al-Jayyousi, O. 2001.
The following tables will present lower figures according 400 Internet: http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/80858e/
to the Yarmouk water use of the period considered. 80858E06.htm
 - do - 470* Baker and Harza. 1955.
 - do - 467 Salameh, E.; Bannayan, H. 1993.
 Lower Jordan river flow into the Dead Sea 1,100-1,400 Klein, M. 1998.
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 1,400 Al-Weshah, R. A. 2000.
 1,400 Jaber and Mohsen. 2001.
 1,350 El-Nasser, H. 1988.
 1,850 Internet: http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/80858e/
80858E06.htm
 1,250-1,600 Mimi and Sawalhi. 2003.
 1,500 http://www.fsk.ethhz.ch/encop/13/en13-
ch1.htm#Surface_water_resources
 1,850 http://www.gefweb.org/Projects/Pipeline/Pipeline_6/
Jordan_water_Quality.pdf
 1,450 Baker and Harza. 1955.
 1,370* Our evaluation.
 North (eastern) side-wadis flow in the Lower Jordan river 55+35= 90* THKJ.1977. (Potential surface water resources map);
(natural flow) Baker and Harza. 1955.
 Zarqa river flow in the Lower Jordan river (natural flow) 90* THKJ. 1977.; Baker and Harza. 1955.
 92 Baker and Harza. 1955.
 South (eastern) side-wadis flow in the Lower Jordan river 30 THKJ. 1977. (Potential surface water resources map); Baker and
(natural flow) Harza. 1955. Total flow in which 22 Mm3/year are groundwater
base flow.
 35* THKJ. 2004.
 North (western) side-wadis flow in the Lower Jordan river 25* Orthofer, R. 2001. Calculation according to Baker and Harza. 1955.
(natural flow)
 Middle (western) side-wadis flow in the Lower Jordan river 10* Orthofer, R. 2001. Calculation according to Baker and Harza. 1955.
(natural flow)
 South (western) side-wadis flow in the Lower Jordan river 25* Orthofer, R. 2001. Calculation according to Baker and Harza. 1955.
(natural flow)
 30 Baker and Harza. 1955.
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 Total western side-wadis flow in the Jordan river 58* Baker and Harza. 1955.
 Groundwaters   
 Yarmouk basin safe yield 127* El Nasser, H. 1991.; Salameh and Bannayan. 1993.
 Yarmouk basin flow drained from Jordan into the 105* El Nasser, H. 1991.; Salameh and Bannayan. 1993. (in which 15 Mm3/
Yarmouk river (drainage water) year of base flow).
 Jordan valley basin flow drained to the Jordan valley 22* THKJ. 2004.
(drainage water)    
 Amman Zarqa basin safe yield 88* El Nasser, H. 1991.; Salameh and Bannayan. 1993.
 Amman Zarqa basin flow into Zarqa river (drainage water) 35* El Nasser, H. 1991.; Salameh and Bannayan. 1993.
 Jordan valley basin safe yield (east bank) 20* Salameh, E.; Bannayan, H. 1993. (30 Mm3/year for the entire
Jordan valley basin, recharge occurring on the west bank considered).
 Jordan valley basin flow into the Jordan river 20* THKJ. 1977. (Potential surface water resources map).
  For information: Water drained from the west bank aquifers 125 http://www.gci.ch/GreenCrossPrograms/waterres/gcwater/jordan.html
to the Jordan valley 100 http://law.onzaga.edu/borders/water.htm
 100-150 http://www.mena.gov.ps/part340_m.htm
1950s Volume of water are in Mm3/year ; population in inhabitants * indicates figures chosen in our charts and round off to 5 Mm3/year
and areas in hectares (ha)  
We only present figures which differ from the preceding table   
North (eastern) side-wadis flow into the Lower Jordan river 60* THKJ. 1977. (Natural flow remained unchanged).
Zarqa river flow into the Lower Jordan river 70* THKJ. 1977. (Natural flow remained unchanged).
South (eastern) side-wadis flow into the Lower Jordan river 15* THKJ. 1977. (Natural flow remained unchanged).
Jordan river flow reaching the Dead Sea 1,285* Our evaluation.
Surface of the northern plots irrigated in the Jordan valley 1,500 Interview M. Avedis Serpekian (JVA) October, 2003.
with water from the Yarmouk river
500* Baker and Harza. (1955).
Surface of the middle plots irrigated in the Jordan valley with 1,000 Interview M. Avedis Serpekian (JVA) October, 2003.
water from the northern side-wadi (east) 3,500* Barker and Harza. 1955. (7,000 ha are classified as irrigated land but
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cropping area registered is evaluated at around 50 % of this area).
Surface of the middle plots irrigated in the Jordan valley 1,000 Interview M. Avedis Serpekian (JVA) October, 2003.
with water from the Zarqa river 2,500* Barker and Harza. 1955. (5,000 ha are classified as irrigated land but
cropping area registered is evaluated at around 50 % of this area).
Surface of the southern plots in the Jordan valley from the 1,000 Interview M. Avedis Serpekian (JVA) October, 2003.
southern wadis (east) 2,100* Barker and Harza. 1955. (4,200 ha are classified as irrigated land but
cropping area registered is evaluated at around 50 % of this area).
Surface of irrigated plots in the Jordan valley with water 3,100* Baker and Harza. (1955).
from the side-wadi (west)
Surface irrigated in the Zhor 1,200* Baker and Harza. (1955).
Surface irrigated along side-wadis with water from the 450* Baker and Harza. (1955).
springs in the North
Water used to irrigate the northern plots in the Jordan valley 5* Our evaluation.
is from the Yarmouk river
Water used to irrigate the northern plots in the Jordan valley is 30* (25+5) Our evaluation.
from the northern wadis (east)
Water used to irrigate the plots located on the West Side 35* Our evaluation.
of the Jordan river
Water used to irrigate the middle plots in the Jordan valley is 20* Our evaluation.
from the Zarqa river
Water used to irrigate the southern plots in the Jordan valley 20* Our evaluation.
is from the southern wadis (east)
Water used to irrigate side-wadis plots in the north (east) 5* Our evaluation.
is from Yarmouk basin
Water used to irrigated plots in the Zhor is from the Jordan 15* Our evaluation.
Water from the Yarmouk basin to Irbid municipality 0.2* Our evaluation.
Water from the Amman-Zarqa basin for Amman municipality 2* Our evaluation.
Population of Amman-Zarqa 120,000* Baker and Harza. (1955).
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Population of Irbid 25,000* Baker and Harza. (1955).
1975s Volume of water is in Mm3/year; population in inhabitants * indicates figures chosen in our charts and round off to 5 Mm3/year.
and areas in hectares (ha)  
We only present figures which differ from the preceding table   
Upper Jordan natural flow into lake Tiberius 600 Al-Weshah, R. A. 2000.
660 Internet: http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/80858e/
80858E06.htm
770 Klein, M. 1998.
790* Internet: http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/80858e/
80858E06.htm
The Israeli water abstraction from Upper Jordan Huley Valley 100* Klein, M. 1998.
100* http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/80858e/80858E06.htm
Yarmouk flow after Syrian pumping 380* Our evaluation.
Natural outflow of lake Tiberius 70 ANTEA-BRL. 1995.
60 Hof, F.C. 1998
70 Klein, M. 1998.
65* Our evaluation-Average figure.
Yarmouk basin flow drained from Jordan into the Yarmouk 75* El Nasser, H. 1991.; Salameh and Bannayan. 1993. (in which 5 Mm3/
river (drainage water) year of base flow).
The Syrian water abstraction from Yarmouk river 90* Hof, F.C. 1998. Calculation according to the 1987s treaty between
Syria and Jordan and the Johnston Plan (1955).
The Israeli water abstraction from Yarmouk river to 45* El-Nasser, H. 1998.
the lake Tiberius
Israeli water abstraction from the Yarmouk river to the 25* El-Nasser, H. 1998.
Yarmouk Triangle
Total Israeli exploitation of water from the Yarmouk river 70* El-Naser, H. 1998.; Hof, H.C. 1998.
65 http://www.passia.org/publications/bulletins/water-eng/pages/water04.pdf
100 Al-Jayyousi, O. 2001.
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70-100 http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/projects/casestudies/
jordan_river.html
The Israeli water abstraction from lake Tiberius to the 420-460* Internet: http://www.passia.org/publications/bulletins/water-eng/pages/
National Water Carrier water04.pdf
420-450 http://www.fsk.ethhz.ch/encop/13/en13-
ch1.htm#Surface_water_resources
450 http://www.gefweb.org/Projects/Pipeline/Pipeline_6/
Jordan_water_Quality.pdf
450 Beaumont, P. 1997.
405 Klein, M. 1998.
Irrigation return flow from Israel 40 Internet: http://www.passia.org/publications/bulletins/water-eng/pages/
water04.pdf
45* 20 in the north + 25 in the south (Orthofer, R. 2001.)
Water diverted from the Yarmouk river to the KAC 130* Hof, F.C. 1998.
90-110 http://www.passia.org/publications/bulletins/water-eng/pages/water04.pdf
100-105 Al-Jayyousi, O. 2001.
100-110 Qaisi, K. 2001.
135 JVA personal communication.
125 THKJ. 1977.
Lower Jordan flow after the KAC diversion and after Israeli 245* Our evaluation.
pumping
Lower Jordan flow reaching the Dead Sea 505* Our evaluation.
325 THKJ. 1977.
Northern Ghor irrigated area 6,700* THKJ. 1977. (Map of Location and acreage of irrigated areas).
Middle Ghor Irrigated Area 6,700* THKJ. 1977. (Map of Location and acreage of irrigated areas).
Surface of the southern plots in the Jordan valley 4,185* (1300+1400+1485) THKJ. 1997.
Irrigated area along the northern wadis 700* THKJ. 1977. (Map of Location and acreage of irrigated areas).
Irrigated area along the Zarqa river 1,450* THKJ. 1977. (Map of Location and acreage of irrigated areas).
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Irrigated area in the Yarmouk basin 530* THKJ. 1977. (Map of Location and acreage of irrigated areas).
Irrigated area in the Amman-Zarqa basin 5,450* THKJ. 1977. (Map of Location and acreage of irrigated areas).
Water from KAC to northern Ghor 65* THKJ. 1977. (Map of Water for irrigation, average year conditions).
Water from KAC to middle Ghor 50* THKJ. 1977. (Map of Water for irrigation, average year conditions).
Water pumped from Jordan valley basin to irrigate 10* THKJ. 1977. (Map of Water for irrigation, average year conditions).
southern Ghor
Water from wadis to irrigate southern plots in the 20* THKJ. 1977. (Map of Location and acreage of irrigated areas).
Jordan valley
Water from wadis to irrigate areas along the northen wadis 15* THKJ. 1977. (Map of water for irrigation, average year conditions).
Water from the Zarqa river to irrigate areas along the 20* THKJ. 1977. (Map of water for irrigation, average year conditions).
Zarqa river
Northern side-wadis discharge 75* THKJ. 1977.
Northern side-wadis flow into the Lower Jordan river 60* Our evaluation.
Zarqa river natural discharge 85* Khori, R. 1981.
Zarqa river flow in the Lower Jordan river 75* Our evaluation.
Water from the southern side-wadis flow into the Jordan river 3* Our evaluation.
Water from northern wadis is utilized for municipal and 3.5 THKJ. 1977.
industrial uses in Irbid
Water pumped from the Yarmouk basin to irrigate farms in 5* THKJ. 1977.
the Yarmouk basin
Water pumped from the Yarmouk basin for municipal and 2,3* THKJ. 1977.
industrial uses in Irbid
Water pumped from the Amman-Zarqa basin to irrigate farms 65* THKJ. 1977. (Map of water for irrigation, average year conditions).
in the Amman-Zarqa basin
Water pumped in the Amman-Zarqa basin for municipal and 25* THKJ. 1977. (Map of water for irrigation, average year conditions).
industrial uses in Amman-Zarqa
Water pumped from Azraq for municipal use in Irbid 2,3* THKJ. 1977.
Population of Amman 1,100,000* THKJ. 1977.
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Population of Irbid 360,000* THKJ. 1977.
2000s Volume of water are in Mm3/year; population in inhabitants * indicates figures chosen in our charts and round off to 5 Mm3/year.
and areas in hectares (ha)  
We only present figures which differ from the preceding table   
Upper Jordan natural flow into lake Tiberius 475 Internet:http://www.passia.org/publications/bulletins/water-eng/pages/
water04.pdf
520 Al-Jayyousi, O. 2001.
475* Our evaluation.
Natural outflow of lake Tiberius 35* Orthofer, R. 2001.
The Israeli water from Yarmouk river according to the 25* Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty. 1994.
Peace Treaty, 1994
Winter concession to Israel from Yarmouk river 25* Peace Treaty. 1994.
The Jordanian water abstraction from lake Tiberius 50* Peace treaty. 1994. Not yet received.
according to the Peace Treaty, 1994
Syrian water abstraction from Yarmouk river 200* El-Nasser, H. 1988.
160 Internet: http://www.passia.org/publications/bulletins/water-eng/pages/
water04.pdf
180 ANTEA-BRL. Schema directeur indicatif de gestion des resources en
eau du basin du Jourdain
170 Al-Jayyousi, O. 2001.
220 Hof, F. C. 1998. And http://jordanembassyus.org/112298002.htm
130-180 Klein, M. 1998.
160-170 Beaumont, P. 2002.
The Israeli water abstraction from Yarmouk river to 70* 45+25 El-Nasser, H. 1998.; Hof, F.C. 1998.
The lake Tiberius
Flow of water in the Yarmouk river after Syrian pumping 240-280 GTZ. 1998.
270* THKJ, 2004 and Internet: http://www.jordanembassyus.org/
112298002.htm
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Lower Jordan flow after the KAC diversion and after 120* Our evaluation.
Israeli pumping
Saline pumping from the Jordan river to Israel 7* Orthofer, R. 2001.
Diversion of saline water from Israel to the Jordan river 30* Orthofer, R. 2001. (20 +15 Mm3/year in the north and 15 Mm3/year to be
rejected in the south of the Jordan valley).
Lower Jordan flow reaching the Dead Sea 400 Al-Weshah, R. A. 2000.
220-250 Klein, M. 1998.
100-200 Orthofer, R. 2001.
250-300 Salameh, E.; Bannayan, H. 1993.; Al-Jayyousi, O. 2001. (+ 15 Mm3 of
drainage water from Amman Zarqa basin).
315* Our evaluation (in which 275 Mm3/year are coming from the Jordan
river).
Zarqa river natural discharge 60* Salameh, E.; Bannayan, H. 1993.; Al-Jayyousi, O. 2001. (+ 15 Mm3 of
drainage water from Amman Zarqa basin).
Water from lake Tiberius to the KAC 45* Treaty of Peace, 1994 storage for Jordan in Tiberius 25 + 20
Water from the Yarmouk river to the KAC 70 ANTEA-BRL. 1995.
60 Hof, F. C. 1998.
90* Average figure on 1990-2001 according to the JVA Water Resources
Department database.
Water in the KAC before the Mucheibeh wells junction 90-110 Internet: http://www.passia.org/publications/bulletins/water-eng/pages/
water04.pdf
100-105 Al-Jayyousi, O. 2001.
130 Hof, F. C. 1998.
100-110 Qaisi, K. 2001.
90 Interview: with Nayef Seder from JVA.
135* Our evaluation.
Water from Mucheibeh wells to the KAC 20* Al-Jayyousi, O. 2001.
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25 Grawitz, B. 2001.
Yarmouk basin flow drained from Jordan into the 55* THKJ. 2004.
Yarmouk river (drainage water)
North-eastern side-wadis total base and flood flow 56,5* THKJ. 2004. (in which 35 Mm3/year are aquifer base flow).
40.5 JICA. 2001.
50 JVA database.
North side-wadis flow into small dams in the northern valley 20* Water Resources Department, JVA.
Non-tapped water from north side-wadis 10* Our evaluation.
(Discharge in the Jordan river)
Water from northern side-wadis to KAC 20* Water Resources Department, JVA.
Evaporation from northern side-wadis dams 2* Our evaluation.
Evaporation from King Talal dam 2* Our evaluation.
Evaporation from Karamah dam 1* Our evaluation.
Water from side-wadis to irrigate areas along the northern 25* Our evaluation.
side-wadis (upstream use)
Water from the Zarqa river to irrigate areas along the 35* Our evaluation.
Zarqa river (upstream use)
Diverted water from northern side-wadis to irrigate areas 15* Our evaluation.
in the Jordan valley
Water from southern side-wadis to irrigate areas along the 20* Water Resources Department, JVA.
southern side-wadis Hisban-Kafrein (upstream use)
Water from southern dams to irrigated area along southern 15* Water Resources Department, JVA.
side-wadis Hisban-Kafrein
Water pumped from the Yarmouk basin to irrigate farms 30* JICA. 2001 and MWI database.
in the Yarmouk basin
Water pumped from the Yarmouk basin for municipal and 30* JICA. 2001 and MWI database.
industrial use in Irbid
Water pumped from the Amman-Zarqa basin for municipal and 20* Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ) database.
60 industrial use in Irbid
Water pumped from Azraq for municipal use in Irbid 6* Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ) database.
Water pumped from the Amman-Zarqa basin to irrigate 75* Our evaluation.
farms in the Amman-Zarqa basin
60 Ministry of Water and Irrigation database.
Water pumped in the Amman-Zarqa basin for municipal 70* Ministry of Water and Irrigation database.
and industrial use in Amman-Zarqa
Water pumped from Azraq for municipal uses in Amman-Zarqa 10* Water Authority of Jordan database.
Water pumped from the Dead Sea basin for municipal and 17* Salameh, E.; Bannayan, H.1993.
industrial use in Amman-Zarqa
Unaccounted water from Amman-Zarqa municipality to the 30* Our evaluation.
Amman-Zarqa basin return flow
Unaccounted water from Irbid municipality to the Yarmouk 10* Our evaluation.
basin return flow
Agricultural return flow in Amman Zarqa basin 15* Our evaluation.
Agricultural return flow in Yarmouk basin 5* Our evaluation.
Agricultural return flow along the Zarqa river 10* Our evaluation.
Total agricultural flow in the Jordan valley 70* Our evaluation.
(Indicative) Total water pumped in Azraq 55 According to MWI digital database.
Amman Zarqa basin flow into Zarqa river 15* Water Authority of Jordan database.
Retreated wastewater flow into the King Talal reservoir 42 Al-Jayyousi, O. 2001.
40 Qaisi, K. 2001.
60* Average figure using WAJ database
Water from the King Talal reservoir (KTR) to the KAC 100 Al-Jayyousi, O. 2001.
85* Our evaluation.
Water from the KTR to the Jordan valley 105* Our evaluation.
Water from the KAC to Amman-Zarqa municipality 45* Salameh, E.; Bannayan, H.1993.
61
50* Average figure using the JVA database on the 1995-2003 period.
Water from the KAC to the north-east and northern Ghor 60 Al-Jayyousi, O. 2001.; HKJ, MWI, JVA. 2000.
55* Water Resources Department, JVA.
Water from the KAC and the KTR to the middle Ghor 35-40 Al-Jayyousi, O. 2001.
65* Water Resources Department, JVA.
Water from the KAC to the southern Ghor 41 Al-Jayyousi, O. 2001.
25* Water Resources Department, JVA.
Water pumped from the JV basin to southern Ghor 20* JICA. 2001.
Water from the north and north-east Ghor to the Jordan 10* Our evaluation.
return flow from agriculture
Water from the Middle Ghor to the Jordan return flow 25* Our evaluation.
from agriculture
Water from the southern Ghor to the Jordan return flow 25* Our evaluation.
from agriculture
Noncontroled water in the KAC winter flows 30* Our evaluation.
Water diverted from the Zarqa river to irrigate land in the 5* Our evaluation.
Jordan valley
Irrigated area along the northern side-wadis 1,600* Calculation according to THKJ, DoS. 2002.; ARD. 2001 and WSSP
 2004.
Irrigated area along the Zarqa river 2,400* Calculation according to THKJ, DoS. 2002.; ARD. 2001 and WSSP
2004.
Irrigated area along the south side-wadis 1,485* Calculation according to THKJ, DoS. 2002.; ARD. 2001 and WSSP
2004.
North-east and northern Ghor irrigated area 8,280 Salman, A. 2001.
11,630 Al-Weshah, R. A. 2000 .
12,100* Calculation according to THKJ, DoS. 2002 and a GIS land use analysis.
Middle Ghor irrigated area 9,110 Salman, A. 2001.
7,770 Al-Weshah, R. A. 2000.
62 7,440* Calculation according to THKJ, DoS. 2002 and a GIS land use analysis.
Southern Ghor irrigated area 3,950 Khori, R. 1981.
4,200 Grawitz, B. 2001.
3,400* Calculation according to THKJ, DoS. 2002 and a GIS land use analysis.
Surface of the southern plots in the Jordan valley, 1,660 Al-Jayyousi, O. 2001.
Hisban Kafrein
1,500 Khori, R. 1981.
1,660 Grawitz, B. 2001.
1,600* Mean of the figures observed in different articles.
The 14.5 km EGC extension nonirrigated land 6,000 Khori, R. 1981.
4,180 Al-Weshah, R. A. 2000.
5,100* Mean of the figures observed in different articles.
Total irrigated land in the Jordan valley 24,600 Orthofer, R. 2001.
30,000 Grawitz, B. 2001.
23,580 Al-Weshah, R. A. 2000.
22,600* THKJ, DoS. 2002.
Irrigated area in the Yarmouk basin 5,000* HKJ, MWI, GTZ. 2004.
Irrigated area in the Amman-Zarqa basin 14,350* Calculation according to THKJ, DoS, 2002 and ARD, 2001 and WSSP
2004.
For indication: Total irrigated areas in the highlands 23,350* HKJ, MWI, GTZ. 2004.
Population in Amman Zarqa municipality 2,700,000* JICA. 2001.
Population in Irbid 1,100,000* JICA. 2001.
M & I water consumption in Amman-Zarqa 145* WAJ database records.
M & I water consumption in Irbid 55* WAJ database records.
2025s Volumes of water are in Mm3/year; population in inhabitants * indicates figures chosen in our charts and round off to 5 Mm3/year
and areas in hectares (ha)  
We only present figures which differ from the preceding table   
Lower Yarmouk flow after the Wehdah dam 190* Our evaluation according to the capacity of the dam (110 Mm3).
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Evaporation in the Wehdah dam 20* Our evaluation.
Lower Jordan flow after Israeli pumping and KAC diversion 40* Our evaluation.
Water initially diverted to the KAC 135* 45 from Peace Treaty and 90 Mm3 from the Yarmouk.
Lower Jordan river reaching the Dead Sea 170* Our evaluation. To which 30 Mm3/year have to be added from the KAC
and other irrigation return flow.
Water from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea 1,500* Harza.1998.
Water for irrigation purpose at the KAC Intake 75* Our evaluation.
Water for municipal and industrial purposes at the KAC intake 60* Our evaluation.
Water from the valley to the Amman-Zarqa municipality 90* Our evaluation.
Retreated wastewater from Irbid to the KAC 25* Our evaluation.
Water from the northern side-wadis to the KAC 45* Our evaluation.
Water from KAC to irrigate the north-east and northern Ghor 100* Our evaluation (+ 5 Mm3/year of uncontroled diverted water from wadis).
Water from KAC to irrigate the middle Ghor 55* Our evaluation (+ 15 Mm3/year of uncontroled diverted water from the
 Zarqa river).
Water from KAC to irrigate the southern Ghor 55* Our evaluation.
Water from the Jordan river basin to the southern Ghor 20* Our evaluation.
Flow from the King Talal dam to the KAC 125* Our evaluation.
Water flow from Zarqa river to Jordan river 45* Our evaluation.
Water pumped from the Wehdah dam to Irbid 60* Our evaluation.
Water pumped from the Yarmouk basin to Irbid 30* Our evaluation.
Water Pumped from the Yarmouk basin to irrigate 15* Our evaluation.
farms in the Yarmouk basin
Water pumped from the AZB basin to Irbid for 20* Our evaluation.
domestic purposes
Water pumped from AZB basin to Amman-Zarqa for 70* Our evaluation.
domestic purposes
Water pumped from AZB for agricultural purposes 35* Our evaluation.
in the highlands
64 Water from Amman-Zarqa municipality to the Amman-Zarqa 120* Our evaluation.
basin (return flow)
Water from Irbid municipality to the Yarmouk basin (return flow) 5* Our evaluation.
Retreated wastewater flow into the King Talal dam 120* Our evaluation.
Retreated wastewater used in agriculture in the highlands 30* Our evaluation.
Agricultural return flow in the Amman-Zarqa basin 10* Our evaluation.
Water flow from DISI 50* Our evaluation.
Water flow from Maïn 35* Water Resources Department, JVA.
Water flow from Hisban 10* Water Resources Department, JVA.
Water flow from the Mujib dam 35* Water Resources Department, JVA.
Desalinated water from the Red Sea 100* Our evaluation.
Wastewater flow into Samra Treatment Plant 155* Our evaluation.
Evaporation from northern side-wadis dams 5* Our evaluation.
Evaporation from King Talal dam 5* Our evaluation.
Irrigated surface in AZB basin 9,300* Our evaluation.
Irrigated surface in the Yarmouk basin 1,500* Our evaluation.
Population in Amman Zarqa municipality  5,000,000* Calculation based on demographic growth.
Population in Irbid 2,500,000* Calculation based on demographic growth.
M & I water consumption in Amman-Zarqa 390* Our evaluation.
M & I water consumption in Irbid 120* Our evaluation.
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• Gross inflow is the total amount of water entering into the water balance domain from precipitation,
and surface and subsurface sources.
• Net inflow is the gross inflow plus any changes in storage.
• Water depletion is a use or removal of water from a water basin that renders it unavailable for further
use. Water depletion is a key concept for water accounting, as interest is focused mostly on the
productivity and the derived benefits per unit of water depleted. It is extremely important to distinguish
water depletion from water diverted to a service or use as not all water diverted to a use is depleted.
Water is depleted by four generic processes:
• Evaporation: Water is vaporized from surfaces or transpired by plants.
• Flows to sinks: Water flows into a sea, saline groundwater, or other location where it is not readily or
economically recovered for reuse.
• Pollution: Water quality gets degraded to an extent that it is unfit for certain uses.
• Incorporation into a product: Through an industrial or agricultural process, such as bottling water or
incorporation of water into plant tissues.
• Process consumption is that amount of water diverted and depleted to produce a human intended
product.
• Non-process depletion occurs when water is depleted, but not by the process for which it was
intended. Non-process depletion can be either beneficial, or non-beneficial.
• Committed water is that part of outflow from the water balance domain that is committed to other uses,
such as downstream environmental requirements or downstream water rights.
• Uncommitted outflow is water that is not depleted, nor committed and is, therefore, available for a use
within the domain, but flows out of the basin due to lack of storage or sufficient operational measures.
Uncommitted outflow can be classified as utilizable or non-utilizable.
• Outflow is utilizable if by improved management of existing facilities it could be consumptively used.
Non-utilizable uncommitted outflow exists when the facilities are not sufficient to capture the otherwise
utilizable outflow.
• Available water is the net inflow minus both the amount of water set aside for committed uses and the
non-utilizable uncommitted outflow. It represents the amount of water available for use at the basin,
service, or use levels. Available water includes process and non-process depletion plus utilizable
outflows.
• A closed basin is one where all available water is depleted.
• An open basin is one where there is still some uncommitted utilizable outflow.
• In a fully committed basin, there are no uncommitted outflows. All inflowing water is committed to
various uses.
Appendix 2
Categories of River Basin Water Accounting (Molden et al. 2001b)
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Appendix 3
Map of the Surface Subbasins Considered
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Appendix 4
Inflow and Outflow from Subbasins Considered in the 2000s
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Al Katar.
Appendix 5
Pictures (all pictures are drawn from Venot 2004c)
Picture 1. Jordan Valley Landscape
Al Zhor during an exceptional winter flow.
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Al Ghor.
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Picture 3. Rain-fed Agriculture in the Jordanian Uplands
Picture 2. General Landscape of the Jordanian Uplands
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Picture 4. Irrigated Agriculture in the Jordanian Uplands
On the Plateaux.
Along the Zarqa river.
In peri-urban areas.
72
Picture 5. General Landscape of the Eastern Desert
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Appendix 6
Water Balances by Subbasin in the 2000s
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Appendix 7
Indicators of Water Mobilization and Water Use Efficiency in the Lower Jordan
River Basin and Their Evolution During the Period 1950-2025
1950 1975 2000 2025
Renewable blue water 1,588 833 705 861
Total uncontrolled Jordan River flow 1,095 290 160 55
Controlled renewable blue water 493 543 545 806
Controlled surface water 0 15 120 315
Stream water (uncontrolled diversions) 95 189 190 125
Unsued stream water 1,335 489 252 163
Groundwater abstraction 6 110 275 252
Groundwater imports 0 2 30 50
Surface imports + Red-Dead project 0 0 45 225
Withdrawals of basin resources 101 314 585 692
Total withdrawals (with imported water) 101 316 660 967
Total withdrawals (% of renewable blue water) 6 38 94 112
Total withdrawals (% of controlled renewable blue water) 20 58 121 120
Outflow to the Dead sea from inner basin 190 215 155 145
Total outflow of the basin to the Dead Sea 1,285 505 315 200
Volume of withdrawals depleted 54 202 474 705
Groundwater return flow 1 40 89 164
Depleted water (% of renewable blue water) 3 24 67 82
Depleted water (% of controlled renewable blue water) 11 37 87 87
Note: Unit of measure is Million m3
76 Appendix 8
Computing and Noncomputing Return Flows and Impacts on Overabstraction Evaluation in 2000s and in the
Mid-2020s in the Lower Jordan River Basin
Note: Unit of measure is Million m3
Jordan Valley Side-Wadis Yarmouk Amman-Zarqa Lower Jordan
Basin Basin Basin Basin River Basin
Annual recharge+(rainfall direct Recharge + lateral groundwater flow - base flow) 17.5 34 35.5 66 153
2000s
Current abstraction (Mm3/yr.) 25 30 60 165 275
Current abstraction (% of annual recharge) 125 88 169 250 180
Current abstraction minus return flow (% of annual recharge) 100 35 135 161 119
Mid-2020s
Expected abstraction (Mm3/yr.) 25 32 40 140 237
Expected abstraction (% of annual recharge) 125 94 113 250 155
Expected abstraction minus return flow (% of annual recharge) 100 29 87 11 45
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